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Abstract
From 2020 to 2021, there has been an increase in violence against women by 255
percent in Pakistan.1 As a democratic state, Pakistan constitutionally recognizes its women
as equal citizens but the fear of gendered violence acts as an effective deterrent to women
to exercise their rights. My thesis explores the question, why Muslim women who exercise
their rights are potentially subject to violence in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. An
examination of this question demonstrates the historical roots of violence and their
continued effect on the Pakistani Muslim woman as a citizen. Starting from the colonial
period, this thesis maps the nexus of the evolving understanding of the ‘Muslim Woman’
to the present gendered laws of the state. It demonstrates and explores the gap between
rights given and rights exercised by showing the socio-political conception of the term
‘Muslim’ and ‘woman’ in Pakistan.
Narratives of women from the South Asian subcontinent have been cast in the mold
of the female character as the helpless victim and presented as human-interest stories to
elicit sympathy and pity. This disingenuous label of the ‘victim’ disempowers these women
and takes away their stories of resistance and resilience. Keeping this in mind, I have drawn
from primary sources such as interviews, documentaries, and newspapers to highlight the
voice of women as visible, autonomous beings and to bridge the gap between theory and
praxis by focusing on situated experience.
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Introduction

The idea of my thesis was born in the month of September 2020, when there were
horrifying cases of women being brutalized and killed in Pakistan, every day. As cries of
an ongoing femicide ring throughout the country, I am once again forced to confront the
question which has beleaguered the female population since Pakistan’s inception: are
women even considered citizens? Am I, a Pakistani Muslim woman, considered an equal
citizen?
The question of citizenship is of grave importance in the current climate as the role
of women and their relationship with the state is rapidly evolving. Ruth Lister, a preeminent social scientist, and the author of ‘Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives’ was asked
the question, “Why citizenship and, more specifically, why women’s citizenship?”2
For me the answer is two-fold. Firstly, as a Pakistani woman I think there is an
urgent need to reclaim scholarship on citizenship which has historically been dominated
by white academics, as it is fashioned and understood around western political thought.
Christine Keating, a political theorist, emphasizes that the Eurocentric “modes of
theorizing exclude or marginalize consideration of non-Western political thought.”3 As
well as, overlook the transformative work done by non-European countries to shape the
situated reality of their citizens on a more egalitarian and inclusive term. Aya Ikegame, a
social anthropologist, takes this point further by arguing, that “strong religious, communal
and kinship ties in non-European societies were treated as evidence of their inability to
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produce modern citizenship,” and religion as a categorical framework highlights the limit
of Western scholarship, remaining outside the understanding of theoretical citizenship. 4
Thus, to fully understand citizenship in the context of Pakistan, a country that has been
constructed along religious lines, one needs to go beyond Eurocentric frameworks. Thus,
a theory of situated gendered citizenship allows one to understand the on-ground reality of
Muslim women as citizens.
Although one would assume at the outset that citizenship is a gender-neutral
concept, that is far from true. As a theoretical framework citizenship has historically
excluded women. “Even today, many prominent democracy scholars find no contradiction
in categorizing political systems as democratic even when the female half of the population
was prohibited from participating in government.”5 It is a deeply gendered concept which
has real world consequences on the lives of women globally. Lister further expands on this
by highlighting the illusion of “gender-neutrality that embraces the idea there lurks in much
of the literature a definitely male citizen and it is his interests and concerns that have
traditionally dictated the agenda.”6 Rather than assuming equality as a foundational
concept of citizenship, scholars like Natasha Behl and Nira Yuval-Davis, ask how
citizenship experienced unequally based on the intersecting relational differences, like
gender, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, and race.7 However, one of the most important issues
to keep in mind while addressing this concern is: can a concept based on the premise of
excluding women be re-appropriated to fulfill women’s basic rights?
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Secondly, to exist, to be visible, and to make a claim for equal citizenship in
Pakistan is a victory within its own right. It is imperative for us as women to reclaim what
is rightfully ours. The promise of equality needs to be fulfilled and delivered to have a just
society.
However, one must keep in mind that the concept of citizenship does not have a
positive connotation for all groups in a community. Every group, even within the same
community, experiences it differently. Women are not a monolithic group. Religion,
gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality are some of the major markers used to exclude or
include individuals within the ambit of state protection. My thesis especially addresses the
question, why Muslim women exercising their rights are potentially subject to violence in
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Exploration of this question reveals the history of gender
violence as deeply rooted in the country; it uncovers the continued complicity of the state
in legitimizing and reproducing it based on a narrow socio-cultural interpretation of Islam,
and hence, ensuring the status of women as second-class citizens.
Starting from the colonial period, the thesis maps the nexus of the evolving
understanding of ‘Muslim Woman’ and the gendered laws of the state. It demonstrates and
explores the gap between equal citizenship rights accorded by the modern, democratic state
to the Pakistani Muslim woman and the practical reality/experience of these rights. It
focuses on the intersection between the legal and the religious to fully comprehend the
impact of gendered violence on the Muslim female citizen. Violence against women cannot
be assessed only through looking at social/political markers; it is a continuum that spans
from the private, to the public, to the political. It is pertinent to delineate a focus on history
and the mindsets of people, as historical trajectories shape current experiences. In essence,

3

I want to trace the changing relationship of the state with its Muslim female citizen and the
state’s role in gendered violence against women today.
Depending on her geographical location, social class and privilege, a Pakistani
woman can be a working professional making her own choices or find herself devoid of
any agency. For example, a woman situated in a village in south Punjab would have to
adhere to different social mores and constraints than the one located in a city like Lahore.
Even within the same geographical locations, the lived reality of women varies
significantly. Looking at women’s experience through the lens of gendered citizenship
allows one to highlight the contradictory nature of democracy. I do not intend to make
universal claims about the entire female population, but I do believe that this project can
be used as a starting point to draw a broader map of the issues facing the women of
Pakistan.
This thesis is divided into five chapters that each address the uneven terrain of
citizenship and the threat of gendered violence experienced by the Muslim female citizen
in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. By using the framework of gendered citizenship, the
private, the public, and the political are deconstructed as arenas of power and resistance.
Chapter 1: Understanding Citizenship
This chapter introduces the complex subject of citizenship by focusing on T.H.
Marshall’s conception of it and by drawing on Ruth Lister’s analysis of citizenship’s
gendered aspects.8 The three contours of citizenship outlined by Marshall (the civil, the
social and the political) form the basis for my in-depth analysis of citizenship.9 Alongside
8
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Marshall, I also use Natasha Behl’s concept of situated citizenship.10 These concepts in
conjunction with each other clarify the theoretical framework of citizenship through which
the lived experience of the Muslim female citizen is analyzed throughout the thesis.

Chapter 2: Lives of Muslim women under the British Raj
This chapter explores the historical constructions of the idea of ‘Muslim
womanhood’ on the subcontinent. Here I focus on the colonial imagination of the Indian
woman as it was formed according to the ideals of white Victorian womanhood to show
that the effects of this construction still linger on today. The colonial construction of the
oppressed ‘female other’ is rooted in harmful stereotypes and toxic patriarchal notions of
womanhood. The chapter focuses on the beginning of these violent imaginings which
continue to harm the women of Pakistan. By locating the construction of ideas of Muslim
womanhood in the colonial past, I link past stereotypes to present injustices in ideas about
gender and citizenship today.

Chapter 3: Putting ‘Islam’ in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
This chapter highlights how the parameters of ‘Muslim’ and ‘citizen’ are defined
using religion. It sheds light on how political parties define and re-define what and who is
a good citizen based on religion. Since Pakistan’s inception, religion and the state have
been entwined to gain political legitimacy and power and thus it becomes obvious, how
religion (Islam) can be used to give or withhold rights.

10
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Chapter 4: Systems of Oppression
The chapter focuses on the stories of women on the ground to show the lived reality
of the promise of citizenship. It presents an intersectional view of the female citizen in her
own words. It situates her reality in everyday experiences. We see these women up close,
rather than being shrouded in theory or simply being talked about. The systems of
oppression span from the macro, to the meso, to the micro level. Deconstruction of
language used by the interviewees and participants serves a double purpose; it at once
highlights the internalized misogyny and the everyday violence of words, as well as serves
as a tool for empowerment as women engage in subjects that had previously been
considered taboo. The chapter focuses on citizenship experienced and lived.

Chapter 5: Reclaiming Citizenship
The chapter focuses on women as active agents of change. By highlighting
movements spearheaded by women, we can see that they are not passive actors; they are
resisting and negotiating for a space within the patriarchal fabric of the nation state and
thus, making space for themselves in the public and private sphere. The chapter centers on
citizenship as a contestation of rights received and rights performed.

6

Chapter 1. Understanding Citizenship

Citizenship embraces many definitions, some dating back to the time of Aristotle,
and revealing the complexity of the state and its relationship with its inhabitants. Rather
than engage in centuries-old literature about the moral and ethical dilemma posed by this
relationship, many choose to fall back on the British sociologist, T.H. Marshall’s definition
of citizenship. I will also draw on the Marshallian definition of citizenship as it is a
normative concept about equality and a useful marker to gauge inequality alongside a
feminist understanding of the theory. Moreover, I will draw upon Natasha Behl’s
theoretical framework of situated citizenship to make it relevant to the case of Pakistan.
Historically, there have been two contending notions of citizenship, the liberal
rights tradition, and the civic republican tradition. One focuses on the rights of the
individual and the other focuses on the obligations of the individual towards his community
and state. The former emphasizes citizenship as a status and the latter emphasizes it as a
practice.11 For Civic republicans, citizenship is an active role that needs to be practiced;
participation of the individual in the state affairs is seen as a necessary obligation that needs
to be fulfilled. Whereas the liberal rights traditionists adhere to a vision of citizens as
atomized individuals and see citizenship as a status granted to them by the state. The latter
use T.H. Marshall’s triad of civil-political-social rights as a yardstick to push for individual
freedom.

11
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Marshall outlined three elements which define the contours of citizenship, the civil,
the social and the political:
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property
and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The last is of a different
order from the others because it is the right to defend and assert all one's rights on
terms of equality with others and by due process of law…By the political element
I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a
body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a
body. By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum
of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social
heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing
in the society.12
This definition of citizenship presents a nuanced incorporation of both the socialliberal and classical notions of citizenship. By using a gendered lens to situate citizenship,
Marshall’s foundational tenets of citizenship help challenge “the assumption that once
suffrage was achieved for women, blacks, and other minorities, all became automatically
equal subjects.”13
Underlying the debate on gendered citizenship, as Ruth Lister writes in her book
Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, is the link between freedom and the role of the state in
ensuring how that freedom is granted and protected. She talks about two types of freedoms:
negative freedom and freedom as a more positive notion. Negative freedom connotates the
absence of coercion and freedom from external pressure on a citizen’s actions, thus limiting
the role of the government to ensuring protection of the citizen’s individual autonomy. In

12
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the positive notion of freedom, emphasis by the government is laid on the ability of an
individual to participate as a full citizen.14
These two types of freedoms are intertwined and point towards an individual’s
autonomy. If one does not have freedom from external constraints, one cannot exercise the
ability to pursue or participate on one’s own terms; and vice versa, if one does not have the
ability to participate but is free from external pressure, the citizen would not have the
individual autonomy to act upon those freedoms. At the crux of the matter is the concept
of human agency, which political theorist Carol Gould defines as a process of selfdevelopment: “of concretely becoming the person one chooses to be through carrying out
those actions that express one's purposes and needs. This process takes place in a social
context and in developing herself, the individual is also acting upon and thereby potentially
changing the world, a world which at the same time structures the choices available.”15
Instead of viewing these as two binary approaches, Lister views them as
intersectional and advocates for a more centered and integrated approach.16 However, the
process of self-development, in my opinion is also a highly political act that is embedded
in social norms. Thus, the rallying cry of feminist citizenship theorists to re-define the
political is also imperative, as the personal is political (which will later be expanded on
when we talk about the public‒private divide). To address this, Lister advocates for a

14
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“synthetic approach” which views citizenship as a status and as a practice, as well as a fluid
process that is changing.17
This dual approach would allow citizens to act on their own impulses, displaying
agency and personal autonomy while also being active agents in the political arena.
According to Lister, this duality would allow women to challenge the stereotypical and
harmful construction of them as passive victims while they confront the patriarchal nature
of political, civil, and social institutions, which are based on the systemic exclusion of
women.18 Even though women are at a disadvantage at the macro level, they can exercise
their power and autonomy at a micro level. However, individuals that do not participate
fully, or exercise their status as citizens, are not excluded from the nexus of state protection.
If this were the case, as Lister points out, women and minority groups would be effectively
sidelined, widening the gap between theoretical and empirical work on citizenship.19
It is important to focus on the lived reality of women on the ground. Citizenship is
not a linear concept but is multi-faceted; it is best understood by examining the highly
complex and sometimes contradictory nature of lived experiences, as all groups even
within the same community experience it differently. Therefore, we need to draw upon
Natasha Behl’s framework of situated citizenship, which centers the argument around the
experiential journey of women, to bridge the gap between theoretical and empirical work.
As Behl outlines:
Situated citizenship as an approach explains how and why subordinated groups
experience, negotiate, and resist exclusionary inclusion in multiple domains. A
17
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theory of situated citizenship makes citizens’ embodied, lived experience of gender
and other intersecting categories of difference central to the analysis, and thus helps
explain how and why citizenship has failed its promise of equality. As legal status
situated citizenship requires an analysis of citizens’ access to civil, political, and
social rights. As an embodied intersectional social relation, situated citizenship
enables an analysis of mediating forces, such as relations of power, and asks how
these forces affect citizens’ standing as members and participants in their
communities.20
Behl’s framework allows me to address citizenship outside the ambit of its Eurocentric conception. The Western notion of citizenship disregards religious, kinship and
communal bonds as incompatible with modern citizenship.21 However, in countries like
Pakistan, the ultimate marker of a good, ideal citizen is foregrounded in the very conception
of religion. The normative conception of religious parties like Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan
(TLP), and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), is that of disempowering women and sidelining them in
the political sphere. But as Amina Jamal demonstrates in her book, Jamaat-e-Islami:
Women in Pakistan, religion can be a site for renegotiating the terms of participation as
well as their status as active citizens. She posits that Islam as a religion offers infinite
possibilities which are fully compatible with the modern understanding of citizenship.
Situated Citizenship as a framework also allows me to draw from my own
experience (as a Muslim woman in Pakistan), and that of my interviewees what Behl call’s
‘exclusionary inclusion’ as a Muslim woman.22 Behl characterizes this exclusionary
inclusion as a daily contradiction within all spheres of life, where the formal promise of
equal citizenship is made but never delivered.

20
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It is a means to address limited membership extended to women in the political,
civil (including religious communities), and social realm. “A situated analysis of
citizenship makes visible the mechanisms of exclusionary inclusion that limit inclusion for
some, explains the contradiction between expressed commitment to equality and lived
reality of inequality within and between multiple levels of analysis, and asks how these
limitations and contradictions impact democratic participation and inclusion for all.”23

1.1 Do We Belong? Understanding the Muslim Woman as a Citizen
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan ostensibly protects and supports gender equality.
However, Pakistani women are amongst the most marginalized in the world. This
superficial promise of state protection is only delivered on paper. How women experience
citizenship is altogether a different matter. “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who
are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with the respect to
the rights and duties to which the status is endowed.”24 But are women allowed to become
full members? And are we allowed to belong? If the Muslim man is the ideal citizen in
Pakistan, can the Muslim woman be a full citizen?
According to Nira Yuval-Davis, belonging is about feeling connected to a place
and feeling safe there. People can belong in different capacities to different places.
“Belonging can be an act of self-identification or identification by others… [it] is always a
dynamic process, not a reified fixity, which is only a naturalized construction of a particular
hegemonic form of power relations.”25 It is not static in nature and is subject to change

23
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over time. She goes on to outline how belonging is constructed on three major levels. “The
first level concerns social locations; the second relates to individuals’ identifications and
emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings; the third relates to ethical
and political value systems with which people judge their own and others’ belonging/s.”26
Social locations are embedded in a society. When we talk about someone’s gender,
age-group, ethnicity, religious affiliation or even their occupation, we are trying to place
them in an economic or social location. These locations have been shaped by history and
the politics of power in particular moments in time. For example, a young Muslim woman
under colonial rule versus a woman in modern day Pakistan have completely different
social connotations attached to them; the power dynamics have shifted and changed over
time. These positionalities are structured around an axis of power that is subject to change
historically. The meaning attached to these positionalities is fluid and contested, and often
based on multiple social markers. That is, a Pathan Muslim woman would have a vastly
different experience as a Pakistani citizen than a Punjabi Muslim woman. These markers
of identity are intersectional in nature and inform the identity of an individual based on a
“power axis of difference.”27 However, social divisions in themselves do not hold concrete
meaning as the example illuminates; to be a woman means different things to different
women based on class, ethnicity, and religious affiliation in Pakistan. Identification around
these axes renders the female citizen visible, which in turn can lead to liberatory power
because being visible as a woman in this cultural stratosphere is a form of resistance.

26
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As Yuval-Davis rightly points out, without individuals who construct the meaning
behind these socio-political markers, other members in the society would not be able to
identify them.28 Bringing us to the second level the belonging discourse, which is
identification and emotional attachments. Identities are based on the identification of
individuals with groups and collectivities. We can at once belong to multiple groups and
collectivities, which in conjunction with each other inform our identity. However, such
identification is directly or indirectly linked to how the members of the group view you.
How the group identifies you and in turn how you identify yourself and vice versa, is
informed by the perception of one with the other.
The construction of belonging and longing to belong are also transitional. They
both need affirmation and re-affirmation through one’s actions. “Constructions of
belonging have a performative dimension.”29 They become more pronounced and crucial
when threatened. Emotional attachments of an individual’s identity are also subject to this;
the more hostility they feel, the more certain aspects of their identity might be highlighted.
In the context of Pakistan, this was in response to colonists labelling Indian men as
effeminate and Indian women as promiscuous. “The feminization of the colonized male at
the hands of the colonial power was matched by the vigorous assertion of masculinity in
the home; a masculinity proved and redeemed by an equally exaggerated femininity,” and
piety (expanded in chapter 2).30
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Identities and belonging effect the social positioning of individuals within groups
and places. However, as Frantz Fanon points out, these identifications and positionings
need to be deconstructed and resisted by the oppressed.31 These forced constructions and
positionalities favor the powerful and can be internalized by the oppressor. Internalized
patriarchy in women is one of such examples found within Pakistan and the rest of the
world.
The third level through which belonging is constructed is through ethical and
political values.32 As mentioned earlier, the politics of belonging is constructed when all
three levels come together. They work in tandem with each other, informing one’s sense
of self by how they view themselves, how they are included/excluded from groups and
collectivities, how these boundaries of belonging are acted out, and the resistance or
acceptance around them. The third step of drawing boundaries and how these social
locations, identity, and emotional attachments effect an individual is a political act.
Inclusion and exclusion are a political regulatory process of the state to wage a war
of control over its subjects. In Pakistan, the politics of belonging are used to push forth a
homogenized Muslim identity, by making categorical boundaries of insiders and outsiders.
Insiders usually have access to the Marshallian promise of citizenship, while outsiders are
pushed to the periphery. The heterosexual Sunni Muslim man is the most desirable citizen,
who performs his rights and obligations by working towards a unified (read Sunni Muslim)
identity, an economically prosperous vision of Pakistan, or by physically preforming one’s
belonging and attachment by defending the homeland and joining the military. The tension
31
32
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between equality and difference is played out by using religion as the most effective tool
to gain more power and control for the state (expanded in chapter 3). Women, as the most
vulnerable segment of society, are easily silenced by using discriminatory laws like the
Law of Evidence of 1984, which reduces a woman’s testimony to half of that of the man.
On the other hand, Article 25 of the constitution states that all citizens of Pakistan are equal
before the law and are entitled to equal protection; there shall be no discrimination based
on the gender of an individual.
This contradictory arena of politics, highlighting difference at one point and
universality at another, is subject to change according to the political goals of the nation
state. The state is perceived through a masculine lens, while the nation is conceived through
feminine imagery. Like the state, men are thought to be rational, individualistic, decisive,
and worthy of being treated as equals, whereas women are considered weak, emotional,
and more focused on community and home. This biased perception of women comes across
in the legal sphere; law is not a neutral body but is constitutive of power relations embedded
in larger structures. Thus, when the constitution states in the law of evidence that “in
matters pertaining to financial or future obligations, if reduced to writing, the instrument
shall be attested by two men, or one man and two women, so that one may remind the
other, if necessary, and evidence shall be led accordingly.”33 Such reasoning propagates
the notion of women being less than men, and civically incapable of performing their duties
as citizens. “Their relation to the state tends to be mediated by men and ceases to be a direct
one as an individual citizen.”34 The Pakistani Muslim woman is at once excluded and
included within the ambit of citizenship; Natasha Behl calls these contradictory lived
33
34
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experiences ‘exclusionary inclusion’. The Muslim woman poses a perfect dilemma of the
construction of belonging, as she identifies herself as a Pakistani, Muslim, female citizen.
Being Muslim and Pakistani are advantageous positionings in the country, whereas the
conception of the woman, and a contender for equal citizenship makes her a threat to the
patriarchal structure of the state.

Conclusion
Citizenship is a multifaced concept, that offers multiple theories with differing
interpretations. T.H. Marshall presents a foundational understanding of it, describing
citizenship as based on social, civil and political rights. By using Natasha Behl’s
conception of situated citizenship in conjunction with Marshall’s definition of it, the gap
between the theory and praxis can be assessed for the female Muslim citizen of Pakistan.
Situated citizenship emphasizes that citizenship is experienced differently by
different groups based on their location on the axes of power that are gender, age, class,
ethnicity, race, and sexuality. Pakistan’s failed promise of equality for all its citizens is
highlighted by the hierarchical structure of the state, which makes the Sunni Muslim male
an ideal citizen, and thus, relegates women and minorities to the status of second-class
citizens.
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Chapter 2. Gender and Imperialism: Lives of Muslim Women Under the British Raj
The Islamic nationalist discourse that created Pakistan left an indelible mark on the
conception of Muslim womanhood in the country. In this chapter, I locate the historical
construction of the idea of Muslim womanhood. By situating the woman in the nineteenth
century, we can delineate the idea of the ‘female other’ that was promulgated through the
gendered laws of the colonial state. Due to which, Muslim womanhood was constructed
along a patriarchal reading of Islam, reflecting the increase in conservativism of the
Muslim community.

2.1 Constructing the Other
Representations of people and histories are rooted in structures of power. Focusing
on history of British India, orientalist and colonialist discourse against colonized Indians,
sheds light on the conception of the other, the Muslim, the female. One must look for how
that conception came to be and locate it in the structures of institutional power and
knowledge. Moreover, it is imperative to understand the impact of the label of the other
bestowed on the native because he responded to these constructions by internalizing or
rejecting them.
In 1818, James Mill wrote A History of British India, a three-volume work that
attempted to highlight the necessity of British colonial rule in India. He painted the Mughal
rule as “foreign”, “despotic” and “degenerative,” and therefore justifying the civilizing rule
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of the British Empire.35 Mill’s work represents the construction of what Edward Said calls
the Oriental, constructed by the Western Orientalist.
The British Empire constructed the Orient as a binary opposite of the West, the
Occident. By labelling the whole East as the Orient, and all non-European, non-white
people as Orientals, the colonial masters homogenized and erased difference within the
Eastern nations. “There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominates; the
latter must be dominated.”36 Said goes on to say that by using such rhetoric the West
justifies its imperial rule, which entails seizure of lands in the orient and the exploitation
of its resources and culture.
By Said’s logic, the orient is what the orientalist says it is. It is trapped within the
framework of power, unable to speak for itself. According to Bannerji, the India that Mill’s
constructed in his work, is the India as seen by the agents of Empire; anything negating
these representations would be considered un-Indian. “Knowledge gives power, more
power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of
information and control,”37 and the relationship between the Orient and the Occident falls
within this ambit. It is a relationship between the dominant and the dominated. Since the
knowledge of the Orient is generated out of a position of strength, this knowledge shapes
how the orient is seen and how the oriental situates himself in it; and, in turn, how the
orientalist views himself in opposition to all that the oriental is not. To support this
argument, Said, quotes a speech of the Earl of Cromer, in which Cromer highlights the
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essential qualities of the Oriental: “Accuracy is abhorrent to the Oriental mind … want of
accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is in fact the main characteristic of
the Oriental mind. The European is a close reasoner, his statements of fact are devoid of
any ambiguity; he is a natural logician.”38 The Oriental is bound within this dichotomy of
the other, the lesser, the inferior; thus, the construction of these terms limit and constrain
him within these imperial imaginings and within his own mind.
The West pedagogically subjugated the Oriental, by analyzing the Orient through
a Eurocentric lens of knowledge and power; as Sir John Shore said of William Jones’s
work, “His real motive was the pursuit of ‘Knowledge and Truth’, regarding Indian culture
and society in service to his own country.”39 Truth of India the nation and its people, is
constructed by documenting them; these understandings are as much a representation of
the knower as well as the known. Since truth-making is embedded in the might of the
Empire, these misrepresentations are constructions of power. The continuous reification of
the Orient as the other, and Orientals as inferiors was not just a rationalization of the rule
of the Empire, but also, what paved the path and later necessitated the domination of the
Orient in the Western mind.

2.2 Understanding Gender Constructs in Colonial India
Against this backdrop, the Indian – and the woman ‒ is situated in colonial India.
As the white man thought he was superior to the colonized Indian, the white woman also
perceived herself as being above the natives.40 This relationship was emblematic of the
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power structures present in colonial India, as the imperial ideology shaped the narrative of
the colonized and the colonizer. This section locates the white woman within this paradigm,
as the white women abetted and aided the construction of ‘womanhood’ and ‘Indian
womanhood’ within the empire, promoting a “sense of national and racial superiority based
on Britain's imperial status.” 41
Literature about the Orient and the Orientals had been written by the Orientalists.
The understanding of what and how a native Indian acted was in this imperial construction
of them. Where before, empire had been regarded as a wholly male enterprise, recent works
of scholarship by academics like Antoinette M. Burton, Mrinalini Sinha and Rafia Zakria
have complicated this understanding by locating the role of white women in colonial India.
White women benefitted from the structures of power; they attained power by being in
proximity to power, as most white men in colonial India had administrative positions.
White women aligned themselves within the imperial stratification and through that gained
significant social standing.
Moreover, Western feminism re-iterated the ethos of imperialism as it gained
influence and authority through it. In "Chathams, Pitts, and Gladstones in Petticoats,”
Mrinalini Sinha substantiates this viewpoint by focusing on the role of white women in the
proposed passing of the Ilbert Bill of 1883. The Ilbert Bill, also provides an insight in how
the othering of the Indian women played out to further subjugate both Indian men and
women. “To not create a fixed division between women as victims and women as agents
who have created their own spaces, cultures and loves to emphasize either one without the
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other creates an unbalanced history… Women's support has always been crucial to the
endurance of patriarchy; hence we must examine and understand the motivations of women
who have colluded in their own oppression,” and in the context of white women, the
oppression of the other. 42
The Ilbert Bill sought to empower native Indian judges to preside over cases
involving European British subjects in India, at the district level. This would grant Indian
judges’ judicial power over the non-white offenders as well, whereas before, only British
judges could pass a sentence over British Indians. However, white women living in British
India pushed to get the bill revoked. “The general opinion was that white women were far
more vociferous in their opposition to the bill than their male counterparts.”43 By protesting
this bill, for the first time, white women entered the political arena.
As part of the imperialist structure, the white woman viewed the natives, as
constructed by the empire, backwards and uncouth. “Anglo-Indians considered native
civilians’ ‘effeminate’ and consequently unfit to try men and women of a more civilized
race.”44 Moreover, Indian men were characterized as barbaric and unmanly, bereft of
sophisticated companionship that would allow them to understand the refined nature of
European British women. The white women emphasized the backward nature of the Indian
man by presenting the Indian woman as ignorant and superstitious. Sinha quotes the wife
of an Anglo-Indian official as saying, “childish and ignorantly superstitious women by
whom the native Magistrate has been, and may be still, surrounded ... deviate his ideas of
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our sex.”45 This statement effectively used the native woman as a representation of native
man. Such views propagated and abetted the idea of white women being an extension and
representation of white men.
The other point of contention for white women against the Ilbert Bill being passed
was the imagined threat of actual physical danger. White women feared they would become
“victims of unbridled native lust.”46 This unsubstantiated future misuse of power by the
magistrates proved to be a major obstacle. White women used the imperial trope of native
men as deceitful and dishonest, and Indian women as ignorant to weaponize “patriarchal
racism.”47 The image of pure, chaste white women targeted by lascivious natives was used
to further persuade Anglo-Indian men to go against the bill.
British feminism “depended on the relative, if temporary, powerlessness of nonwhite women,”48 who could be used as tools to realize the goals of white women and used
as symbolic markers against which their own success could be gauged. Thus, a construction
of the Indian woman as oppressed, ignorant, and backwards, was used to subjugate Indian
man as well as women, by the collusion of white man and women.

2.3 Impact of Colonial Laws on Native Women in India
The laws that were introduced in India pertaining to women’s rights and
emancipation were in line with the Victorian ideal of womanhood, “chastity, innocence,
self-effacement, and passiveness,” which did violence to the notion of gender of the
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colonized people.49 Instead of focusing on Indian women, the laws furthered the interests
of colonial rulers, native elite men, and British feminists.
India was confined to a Eurocentric legal framework; its pluralistic legal tradition
was erased to make it more scientific and logical.50 “The territorial possession of India was
at the same time an act of construction of authoritative knowledge, ‘compiled’ and
‘selected’ as Indian Law, by the rulers.”51 However, as Chitnis has outlined, the unification
and reform of law during this time was due to cooperation between the colonial rulers and
the local elites. It was to the benefit of the native elite to work with the colonial authority
to gain access to the systems of power being implemented in the country. Moreover, the
native elites wanted to have a say in defining the new parameters that defined what was
‘Hindu’, ‘Muslim,’ or ‘Indian’, also making them complicit in gender reforms being
implemented in redefining colonial India.52
Thus, the body of the Indian woman became the battleground on which the struggle
to gain more control was fought among the colonial rulers, the native elites, and the British
feminists; effectively rendering Indian women voiceless and silent. All these entities had a
stake in controlling and defining the parameters to gain more control or authority, but the
women for whose alleged benefit the laws were being implemented had no say.
The age of consent reform in Britain was introduced to curb prostitution, as
prostitution was weakening the power of the Victorian wife in Britain. It was believed that
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young girls could not appropriately control their sexual behavior and therefore, they fell
prey to prostitution. Thus, the age of consent was increased from thirteen to sixteen.
Age of consent arose in the context of prostitution in England because prostitution
threatened efforts to curb sexual excess ‒ a task taken on by Victorian wives, clergy,
and middle-class men who equated sexual restraint with moral and civil superiority.
These groups generally linked social stability with domestic stability, which they
defined as compliance with norms of sexual restraint.53
Age of consent laws travelled to India in the Nineteenth century, “in the context of
prostitution and child marriage, respectively, which were social issues directly linked to
Victorian notions of domesticity and sexual restraint.”54 It was imported to India to remodel
the Indian family structure and to align it within the Eurocentric conception of a family
structure. The age of consent law not only highlights the significance of trying to assert
control over the female body but also how religion, specifically notions of Christian
morality, were used to construct the ideal Victorian subject. This idea highlights how
religion as the basis of citizenship is an idea inherited from the West. Victorian ideologies
made their way to the subcontinent based on Christian ideals. Citizenship in the West still
operates on conservative ideals – Pakistan is not different or unique in using religion to
create the ideal citizen, as chapter three will discuss in more detail.
The Age of Consent Bill 1891 changed the age of consent in India from ten to
twelve.55 The local elite men in India did not approve of the interference of the British in
family matters. The colonial rulers were willing to accommodate the demands of the native
elites provided they did not enrage the British public at home, while the native male was
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insistent on keeping the colonizer out of the private domain of his house. This bill posed a
threat to the native man’s control over the Indian family and his authority over women’s
sexuality and property.
The Indian woman was caught between the double patriarchy of the British colonist
and the native Indian man. The Colonial rulers themselves were reluctant to interfere in
Indian family law because “they did not want widows or single women falling on the
welfare of the parish or the state because women generally were to be under the dominion
of a man.”56 Therefore, the colonial rulers only changed the age of consent but did not
change the age of marriage to appease the native elites, as well as British feminists. The
colonial rulers framed this law as protecting young girls from sexual activity that could
have adverse impact on their health. “The age of consent was raised without changing the
age of marriage, the state was introducing the possibility of marital rape within Indian
families at a time when England itself did not recognize the crime.”57 Rather than bringing
any significant change, the British became complicit in further supporting the patriarchal
structures of Indian society.
This position is further substantiated by Elizabeth Kolsky. In the “The Rule of
Colonial Indifference,” she highlights how the British viewed physical violence by native
men against native women as a social problem that should be handled by the Indian men
themselves rather than the colonial state. It did not merit the same attention as sensational
crimes like sati, the self-immolation of widows, which was used to legitimize the civilizing
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mission of the Empire within India. Rape was considered as a common criminal offence in
the sense that it was found across cultures, worldwide.
Furthermore, “the establishment of colonial legal institutions unwittingly drew
British authorities into policing domestic violence in ways that frequently reinforced native
patriarchal authority and the state’s political power.”58 This was substantiated by
Governor-General Warren Hastings’ Plan for the Administration of Justice (1772).59 He
outlined a non-interventionist approach, which meant introducing new laws, but also
keeping the old ones intact.60 Hastings divided the law into two spheres, the private and
the public, relegating family, succession, inheritance, and marriage to the private sphere,
to be conducted according to religious and personal law. However, the public sphere, fell
under the jurisdiction of the colonial state where non-religious law would be applied on
commerce, taxation, and property.
By dividing the law into these two spheres, the British rendered invisible the native
female. Since, Hastings’ plan abolished fines against crimes that were related to women,
like, “adultery, fornication, seduction, rape, and other ‘offenses against morality’ on the
grounds that such matters should not be publicly exposed in the courtroom.”

61
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abolishment removed any repercussions that would be faced by the perpetrators of violence
against women, thus, pushing women outside the protection of the state and law.
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Moreover, “until 1860, the criminal law of most of British India was a hybrid mix
of Islamic law and Company regulations referred to as Anglo-Muhammadan law,” and
early laws applying to rape were an integration of the two.62 One of the most important
figures who defined rape in the eighteenth century was Matthew Hale. He defined it as
“vaginal penetration by a man (or men) of a female above the age of ten years and against
her will … Hale was predominantly concerned with the perceived problem of false charges,
and he framed rape victims as a special class of witnesses to whom special standards of
truth applied.”63
The Victorian distrust of the female seeped into the judicial construction of the rape
law, where the victim was under scrutiny to prove a claim to innocence, rather than the
accused having to prove his. Hale shifted the politics of the accused and the accuser,
whereas before, “Islamic criminal law [was] organized around a principle of private justice
in which individuals initiate criminal proceedings, subordinating the role of government
and privileging the needs and wishes of the victim.”64 Due to the shift in legal politics,
women were seen as prone to lying and were framed as non-credible witnesses, this became
known as the “Hale warning.”65
The ‘Hale warning’ had a debilitating effect on native women, as they were viewed
within an oriental framework. They were seen as doubly suspect, first for being women
and second, for being Indian. In the case of native Muslim women, they were further
maligned, as the British saw Muslims as promiscuous because of the acceptability of
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polygamy in their religion. To explain this difference, Durba Mitra quotes the Deputy
Magistrate of Madaripur as saying, “A Mohamedan, if he chooses a woman, can marry her
today and renounce her tomorrow, a wife so given can marry another. His religion
sanctions this. But the case is quite different with a Hindoo. His religion is very jealous in
this respect.”66
The legal situation further demerited the native women, along with the Hale
warning, a new set of evidentiary requirements were introduced by the British. The
evidentiary system was used to corroborate the claims made by the victim (Indian woman),
based on scientific principles, which cast them as suspects. Through the introduction and
evolving science of Medical Jurisprudence, truth was located in and on the body.67 This
entailed that the victim’s body should have sufficient evidence to support their claim.
Moreover, the victim’s “class and caste status; prior sexual history; fresh complaint
(lodging of charges); and evidence of resistance of the body evidencing the crime,” were
scrutinized during the trial.68 These four stipulations were seen as corroborative truths.
These colonial laws made women increasingly vulnerable to patriarchal structures
and posed further difficulties in accessing justice within the frameworks of law. Even
though these social reforms were introduced and implemented under the guise of helping
native Indian women, however, the Indian woman was further classified based on her
religious identity making it harder to prosecute a charge in court.
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2.4 Post-Colonial Legacies
Hastings gendered split of the public and private laws evolved into a division
between the private and public domains. This idea was co-opted by Indian nationalists to
promote and highlight the dissimilarity between the colonizer and the colonized.
The Muslim communities of India felt an impending triple threat of erasure of their
identities, values, and culture. They viewed the dominant British values permeating Indian
society in direct conflict with their socio-religious identities, being also wary of the new
modes of imperial education that were being introduced along with the Hindu majority of
India and their traditions and customs. In response to this, Indian Muslim nationalism was
born to protect the Muslim identity.69
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan introduced a modern Muslim nationalism, which reaped the
benefit of western sciences and secular knowledge while also safeguarding Muslim
tradition and culture. The false binary that had been constructed in colonial rule between
tradition and modernity was used to navigate the changing political stratosphere. He coopted the private ‒ public divide to preserve an authentic Muslim Identity. The private
domain was to be protected from the outside influence of the colonizer and the Hindu.
Thus, Sir Syed stated, “A young woman should not even open her mouth in front of an
unrelated man. She must not even stand in a place where a stranger might see her.”70 The
woman was relegated to the private domain. Just as the British law had rendered her
invisible, now Sir Syed proposed to do the same. However, to steer the changing politics
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of the nation and present a progressive front, Sir Syed supported gendered education. He
proposed that women were to be given a traditional, domestic education that would help
them become good upstanding wives and mothers, reinforcing the role of women as
guardians of the spiritual realm. He contained the role of women in the nation state by
restricting their participation to being only mothers and wives, whereas Muslim men had
to attain secular knowledge so they could help the nation develop and advance. Muslim
Womanhood was constructed to safeguard Muslim manhood: “women protected the
precarious and fearful masculinity of Muslim Males by assuring them that they protected
them!”71
The divide between the spiritual/material, private/public, home/outside was based
on gendered conceptions of womanhood. “The feminization of the colonial man at the
hands of the colonial power was matched by the vigorous assertion of masculinity in the
home; a masculinity proved and redeemed only by an equally exaggerated femininity.”72
To assuage this nationalist anxiety, control and authority over women and the sanctified
inner sphere of the home became more stringent. As Partha Chatterjee outlined in the “The
Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question,” home became a haven, protected from
the impure presence of the colonizer, a sanctuary that protected the spiritual domain of the
community.73
In line with the ghar/bahir or home/outside divide, at the promised inception of
Pakistan, the Muslim clergy started to re-define its role as well. “Islam that emerged in the
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twentieth-century British India, while a response to colonialism and Hindu Nationalism,
was also, a fundamental challenge to centuries-old beliefs and practices of Islam in South
Asia.”74 Abul Ala Maududi, the leader of the Muslim reformist movement and the Jamaate-Islami, intertwined religion with politics. Maududi, believed that politics had an essential
part to play in religion, that they were inextricably linked together75. If the Muslim nation
is to succeed, Muslims should apply themselves to politics. However, he did not include
women within this mandate, as women’s role was to be confined to the private.

Conclusion
Tracing a trajectory of the re-defined Muslim identity through history, provides us
with insights on the cause and effect of imperial policies and Orientalist constructions on
the lives of the Muslim women. Moreover, the shaping of the legal system based on
gendered secular and religious laws is still in practice in Pakistan. The patriarchal
exclusionary tactics that are practiced, are rooted in the country’s colonial past. There are
echoes of colonial ideological framing of the woman as deviant and other, embedded in
the justice system, framing its gendered readings as protectionist or patriarchal.
The colonial construction of womanhood by British colonizers (both male and
female) changed the conception of gender in India. The harmful stereotypes propagated by
the British that labelled the native man as effeminate, and native woman as ignorant and
less than a white woman did violence to the colonized. It enforced a hierarchy based on
race as well as gender. This stratification was superimposed on the psyche of the native
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population disrupting their notions of gender and gender norms, in response to which the
Indian man embraced the hyper-masculine and further endorsed the public/private divide.
The oppressed became the oppressor by instating conservative reactionary politics, using
the bodies of Muslim women to conceptualize a separate homeland based on Muslim
values which were made in opposition to those of the West (expanded in chapter 3).
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Chapter 3. Putting ‘Islam’ in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

The idea for an Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been justified by tracing it back to
711 AD when Muhammad bin Qasim, an Umayyad general, conquered Sindh for the
Umayyad Caliphate. Over the years, the state has actively re-enforced its Muslim identity
by tracing its roots back to Muhammad Bin Qasim’s conquest and the spread of Islam in
the Indian peninsula. Colonial historians like Richard F. Burton (1821- 1890) have also
corroborated this in their writings on the history of Muslims in South Asia.
Other historians like Edward B. Cowell, Mountstuart Elphinstone and Henry Miers
Elliot have built upon Burton’s narrative and added to it by linking the advent of Islam in
the sub-continent to the Ummayad General, Muhammad bin Qasim. Muslim nationalists
took the colonial historian’s legitimization of the past in their books The History of India:
The Hindu and Mahometan Periods by Cowell and Elphinstone and The History of India
as told by its own Historians: The Muhammadan Period by Elliot to reify the primordial
relationship between India and Islam and later Pakistan and Islam.76
On 11 August 1947, the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in his first
address to the constituent assembly of Pakistan stated, Pakistan will not be a theocratic
state but a place where all its inhabitants will be granted equal rights.
I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course
of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities — the Hindu
community and the Muslim community — because even as regards Muslims you
have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have
Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalese, Madrasis and so on — will vanish.
Indeed, if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to
attain its freedom and independence and but for this, we would have been free
peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of
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400 million souls, in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it
had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time
but for this. (Applause.) Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free;
you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any
other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion
or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State.77
Even in his later speeches, Jinnah uses a homeland for Muslims narrative and
Islam as a legitimizing force for its creation, but according to Muhammad Qasim Zaman,
Jinnah did not mean that Pakistan should commit to Islamic law in its entirety as Ulema
like Abul Ala Maududi wanted.78
Jinnah’s successor Liaquat Ali Khan drew heavily on Islam to fortify his position
as a Muslim leader. In 1949, under Khan, the constitution of Pakistan’s purpose was being
drafted in the Objectives Resolution by the constituent assembly. The Objectives
Resolution started with impressing that the “Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs
to Allah Almighty alone … Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality,
tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed … Wherein the
Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in
accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and
the Sunnah.”79 However, as Amina Jamal highlights different strands and understandings
of the Quran existed in the subcontinent. But Maulana Maududi made Islam rigid,
inflexible, and codified it.80 He sought to institutionalize a mode of Islamic life that drew
heavily from Saudi Arabia’s Wahabism and its legalistic traditions, thereby undermining
South Asia’s brand of “classical Sunni Islam sometimes referred to as Barelivi and/or Sufi
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Islam today.”81 Thus, the parameters of who and what characteristics are embodied by a
Muslim were not demarcated by the constitution. According to the label of Muslim, Shias
and Ahmadis also identify as Muslims, but the latter group is pushed outside this label by
the state, and the former by the majority of Sunni Muslims of Pakistan.
In 1953, the Basic Principles Committee (BCP) which was established by Khawaja
Nazimuddin on the 12 of March 1949, at the behest of Liaquat Ali Khan, then Prime
Minister of Pakistan, reiterated that in the future, legislation had to be in accordance with
the Quran and Sunnah.82 As the BCP’s job was to determine the principles on which the
future constitution and legislature of Pakistan would be built, it also added a clause that
stated the Head of the State should be Muslim. The standard consensus of the parties was
largely that a non-Muslim could not be the Prime Minister of a Muslim state like Pakistan.
Even though, the idea of a secular state was promoted initially, very quickly being a
Pakistani and a Muslim became intertwined identities.
Even with these religious amendments added to the BCP, right wing leaders wanted
Ahmadis to be declared as non-Muslims by the state. During the All-Pakistan Muslim
Parties Convention held at Lahore in 1952, the clergy demanded that Ahmadis should be
removed from all bureaucratic positions, as they were non-Muslims. Their allegiance to
the state of Pakistan was suspect because of their faith.83
In 1974, under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Ahmadis were declared
non-Muslims, as the state succumbed to extremist pressure. And, in April 1984, under

81

Jamal, Jamaat-e-Islami, 2.
History Pak, “Basic Principles Committee.”
83
History Pak, “Basic Principles Committee.”
82

36

President Zia Ul- Haq, Ordinance XX was issued which “provides for prison terms of up
to three years or unlimited fines for any member of the Ahmadi, Lahori, or Qadiani faith
who in any way poses as a Muslim or refers to himself as a Muslim.”84 Moreover, it stated,
“Pakistan requires every passport applicant and national identity card applicant to make a
declaration of faith and requires any citizen who wishes to be known as Muslim thereon to
make a declaration denouncing Ahmadi Muslims as non-Muslim.”85 The laws and
boundaries of who was a Muslim became narrower and narrower, over time.

3.1 Islam, a Cultural Interpretation
Who gets to be a Muslim is a political game in Pakistan. In 1964 elections, Fatima
Ali Jinnah, the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, wanted to stand in elections as a
Presidential candidate and was met with support from all opposition parties, even Jamaati-Islami. It’s interesting to note that the premise of Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami party was
based on purdah for women, which does not only mean wearing a veil but also that there
should be purdah between the outer domain and the inner domain (as discussed in Chapter
2). Thus, Maududi’s support for the candidacy of Fatima Ali Jinnah was not in line with
the religio-political ideology he had been preaching to his party and followers, but a purely
politically motivated move for his own benefit. It is important to highlight that Maududi
had been jailed by the government of Ayub Khan, the second President of Pakistan. Thus,
Maududi’s support of Fatima Ali Jinnah’s candidacy was in part driven by antagonism
toward Ayub Khan’s regime, but he backed his position with religious interpretation
declaring that:
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The question of nominating Mohtarma Miss Fatima Jinnah as Presidential
candidate is necessitated by sheer circumstances which are a result of extreme
deterioration in the spheres of religion, morality, politics, and economics. In these
circumstances it is incumbent on us to save the country from further chaos and
confusion and set up a candidate who is selfless, determined, incorruptible, upright,
and fearless. These things are found in Miss Jinnah and, therefore, the Jama’at
decided to support her. But this support should in no way create a precedence that
a woman can become head of state.86
However, religious leaders that enjoyed favors of Ayub Khan’s government, for
example Jamaat-i-Ulama, and others that had been appointed in an official capacity as
members of the Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology, opposed this stance vociferously.
Furthermore, they organized an All-Pakistan Sunni Conference in which “650 clerics from
different schools of thought congregated and issued a Fatwa (a formal ruling or
interpretation on a point of Islamic law given by a Muslim religious leader) against Fatima
Jinnah, stating that it is haram (forbidden) for a woman to be the head of the Islamic
State.”87
History here teaches us an important lesson; religious interpretation is politically
motivated and is neither static nor set in stone. Supporters of Fatima Ali Jinnah and Ayub
Khan both, used religion to justify their political position, using opposing readings of Islam
that lent credibility to the rule. Fissures in opposing religious parties with different political
motivations bring this point to the fore. The same happened in 1990 with Benazir Bhutto,
leader of People’s Party Pakistan (PPP), who was declared non-Muslim by Syed Abdul
Qadir Azad, a prominent Muslim religious leader.88 In the 1990’s, PPP’s main oppositional
party was Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz (PML-N) which used gender and religion to
turn the masses against Benazir Bhutto. PML-N started a smear campaign against Bhutto
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that painted her as an immoral anglicized woman, who existed outside the stereotypical
chaste Muslim circle. Even as her social rank and privilege provided a shield, her gender
and her alleged non-Muslim conduct made her a target. Doctored pictures like the one
below was circulated throughout the country, and the slogan “Coca Cola Pepsi, Benazir
Taxi” was chanted in political rallies to cast aspersions on her character. 89

Fig. 1. The headline reads: Benazir’s undress and character’s unconcern.90
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Moreover, as the case was with Fatima Jinnah, Muslim clerics trying to win favor
with PML-N issued a Fatwa against Benazir, declaring her as a non-Muslim, and Maulana
Abdul Qadir Azad, the head of ‘Badhshahi Mosque,’91 went as far as to say, “all her
supporters who believed her to be Muslim, and thus conducted business with her or backed
her political campaign will exit Islam, and will not be allowed to enter heaven.”92
However, Benazir’s party enlisted the help of Yemen’s chief Imam who said there
is written nowhere in Islam that a woman cannot be the head of a state and issued a Fatwa
in favor of Benazir’s governance.93
Benazir Bhutto was quoted in the article “Bhutto’s Fateful Moment” by the New
York Times, in 1993.
The generals were followed by the mullahs, who had already begun to shriek with
despair at the evils that would befall a nation with a woman at its head. “They’d
been saying the most audacious things,” Benazir told me this summer. “They
issued fatwas that I must be stopped, and they circulated pamphlets saying that the
Holy Prophet was weeping tears of blood: ‘Oh, why, why, a woman elected Prime
Minister?’ Some of them even rushed off to Saudi Arabia to seek advice.
Clergymen from Yemen to Egypt pulled out their holy books. I must say, my
election did trigger a great debate in the Islamic world.” During the campaign, the
mullahs, assisted by Sharif and General Gul, had also air-dropped thousands of
leaflets featuring doctored photographs of Benazir dancing in a Paris night club,
and her mother, in a sequined Western evening gown, waltzing at the White House
with President Gerald Ford. “Anti-Islamic” was scrawled across the leaflets in thick
lettering.94
Benazir describes a concerted effort by the Muslim clergy along with the opposition
party to supplant her political leadership based on her gender and alleged non-Islamic
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conduct. Even with the privilege of class and rank, Benazir still had to perform as a good
Muslim woman to be thought of as a candidate to be elected as a leader of a Muslim state.
As mentioned in chapter 2, a good Muslim woman was the opposite of the prescribed
qualities bestowed on the Western woman, occupied the inner domain (ghar),95 was modest
and dressed traditionally. Even as Benazir was bending norms and traditions by contesting
an election and being visible in the outer domain, she still had to play the part of a
traditional, virtuous Muslim woman. Her marriage to Asif Ali Zardari was arranged by her
mother Nusrat Bhutto, and when she joined the political arena, her attire was chosen to
appeal to the nationalist and religious sentiments of the people. As her close friend Dr.
Hamida Khuhro told the New Yorker reporter Mary Ann Weaver:
People were expecting a liberal, Western-educated woman with forward-looking
programs,” I was told by Dr. Hamida Khuhro, who is a formidable woman
herself—an Oxford-educated friend of the Bhutto family but a political opponent
in the feudal Larkana constituency. “When Benazir came to power, she could have
set the trend, but the first thing she did was to shroud herself in a chador, the most
obstructionist, outward manifestation of Islam, and begin praying incessantly at
saints’ tombs, the most superstitious part of Islam. She’s vastly superstitious, and
it shows. She could have been a reformer, but she wasn’t she did nothing for
women, which she could have done. And, with her education and her background,
she simply has no excuse…Benazir later told me, ‘There are some who would have
liked me to solely champion women’s causes. As a political leader, I can’t’.96
Even though women were encouraged to participate in the economic growth of the
nation and to fulfill their role as valuable additions to the growing state by becoming
consumers and workers, they remained marginalized. Benazir’s performative Muslimness
cemented the idea of the good Muslim woman. Her rule “exposed how far Pakistani women
were expected, often as much by themselves as by others, to maintain what was felt to be
95
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a 'proper' balance between their duties as 'daughters' and 'mothers' of the new nation and
their individual rights as its citizen.”97 Jafar explains this process by quoting Kandiyoti,
"the fact that women were no longer secluded or veiled might have mandated new forms
of Puritanism that could be activated as a symbolic shield in a society where femininity
was incompatible with public presence.”98 Moreover, Najmabadi, reiterates this position
by underscoring that when women in Iran gained access to the public domain, they
themselves imposed stringent checks on their behavior and stringently regulated their
conduct, hence de-sexualizing and sanitizing their presence and language.99 In this context,
Benazir Bhutto did the same. She tried to distance herself from Western imaging of a
woman through the use of language, religion, and attire.
Even though the nationalist struggle provided the stage for women to change the
gender roles prescribed to them and challenge the public and the private domain, as
Mumtaz and Shaheed argue, “Muslim women broke through traditional rules and
restrictions, cast off their veils, left their homes, approached strangers, confronted police,
and entered politics.”100 However, once the crisis had passed, women’s participation was
again limited to roles that were linked to those of mothers, wives, caretakers, and nurturers.
The concurrence of old values and modernistic sensibilities in history highlights
patriarchy’s ability to reshape and adapt to its time, appropriating language, and cultural
norms. Benazir Bhutto’s life provides an example of these contradictions, highlighting how
the idea of a good Muslim woman is tied to historical and socio-political understandings
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of that time. Benazir straddled the traditional and the modern world but still was the target
of ire from both sides. For the traditionalists she was not conservative enough and for the
modernists, she was provided a platform to lead, which she could have used for female
emancipation.

3.2 Zia Ul-Haq and Islamization
After declaring martial law in 1977, Zia-ul Haq came to power becoming the 6th
president of Pakistan. Gender and religion became inextricably intertwined under Zia’s
rule, heralding a bleak era for women and minorities in Pakistan. He established himself as
a righteous leader, overthrowing the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto by declaring it unIslamic. Religion had been used to justify the rule of governments since Pakistan’s
inception but no government before had used it as lethally as Zia. He legitimized his coup
by being a champion of Islamic values. In his address to the nation in 1979, he said: "It is
not easy to reform a degenerate society. It requires courage, time, and continuous struggle.
Those who think this work can be done in a day or a week are ignoring the reality."101
Women, who had recently gained visibility in the public sphere became Zia’s
target. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Muslim community in the subcontinent felt that their
identity was under threat by both the British colonists and by the Hindus; the ghar/bahir
divide was enforced to protect the values and traditions of the Muslim community. Thus,
Muslim women were labelled the guardians and symbols of Muslim identity, and Zia
capitalized on this sentiment by labelling women occupying public spheres as westernized
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and anti-Islamic.102 As Zia had fashioned himself as the champion of Islam, Islamic revival
meant going back to the traditional/patriarchal social structures. But trying to appeal and
appease Islamic fundamentalists resulted in the exclusion of women from society.
History disseminated through educational institutions in Pakistan would have us
believe that Zia’s was the only government that pushed women to occupy a peripheral
position in society. Shahnaz Rouse challenges this linear historical narrative which portrays
Zia’s era as the only time in the country’s history where Islam was used to uphold and
endorse patriarchal attitudes about women. In her essay the “Outsider(s) Within:
Sovereignty and Citizenship in Pakistan”, she highlights how such attitudes had been
present since the country’s inception and how women and the minorities (the weakest
factions of the society), had been used to bolster the support of the previous
governments.103 Zia had only brought the patriarchy and bigotry from the private domain
of the house to the public realm of the outside.
Religion has been used to disempower women; women have also used it to
empower themselves; “The demarcation between the pre- and post-Zia periods becomes
less pronounced if we introduce gender into the picture. Not only the state but women’s
groups have also sought to employ religion on their behalf. Thus, women’s groups
themselves fought for the Sharia to be introduced as to permit women’s inheritance
rights.”104 Moreover, changes like Ayub Khan’s Family Law Ordinance were not to curb
gendered abuse in the private sphere but to regularize and restrain the excesses of the
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community. It was also used to bring the private sphere under the surveillance and control
of the government.

3.3 The Hudood Ordinance
Zia targeted the demographic that would have the most visible impact on sending
his message, i.e., women. He popularized the slogan ‘chadar and chaar diwari’ which
translates into the veil and the four walls of the house. This was one of the first steps he
took to enforce his grandiose project of Islamization. He also propagated the idea of
establishing his version of Nizam-e- Mustafa, meaning the system of the Prophet
Muhammad.105 To assist him in this mission, he formed the Majlis-e-Shura which consisted
of individuals that could support his Islamization project. He further used the clergy to
introduce the Hudood Ordinance into the Pakistan Penal Code in February 1979.
The Hudood Ordinance encompassed crimes related to theft, consumption of
alcohol, adultery, and slander. 106 Under the Ordinance, zina (adultery) and zina-bil-jabr
(rape) become intertwined terms. Zina constitutes:
Willful sexual intercourse between man and woman without being married to each
other, and Zina-bil-jabr (zina by force) constitutes intercourse between a man and
a woman who are not married and is against the will of the individual and is nonconsensual. Without consent means consent obtained under duress (fear of death or
hurt) or is gained under false pretenses (i.e., “when the offender knows the offender
is not validly married to the victim and that the consent is given because the victim
believes that the offender is another person to whom the victim is or believes herself
or himself to be validly married.107
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The evidentiary requirements made it next to impossible for rape to be proved in
court as it mandated that proof exists when “the accused makes before a Court of competent
jurisdiction a confession of the commission of the offence; or at least four Muslim adult
male witnesses, about whom the Court is satisfied, having regard to the requirements of
tazkiyah al- shuhood [credibility of witnesses], that they are truthful persons and abstain
from major sins (kabair), give evidence as eyewitnesses of the act of penetration necessary
to the offence.”108 Moreover, if the ‘victim-survivor’ of zina-bil-jabr fails the evidentiary
requirements for proving force, she/they are convicted of Zina.109
Hence, a tradition of silencing the victim began; a woman must have 4 male
witnesses or eight female witnesses to prove that she was raped. The woman’s testimony
in evidentiary law cases came to hold half the weight of that of the male by tracing it to the
Quranic verse 2:282,
And call to witness two witnesses from among your men Î and if there are not two
men [to do so], then one man and two women Î from among those whom you
approve, so that if one of them [the women] errs, the other [of the women] can
remind her. And let not the witnesses refuse whensoever they are called upon [to
testify]. And do not be averse to writing it, whether small or large, to its term.”110
This 2:1 ratio was established by using a gendered interpretation of the Quranic
verse, and as Hina Azam explains, cannot be applied to crimes. According to her, even by
using a traditionalist interpretive lens, crime and contracts cannot have the same
evidentiary requirements, as the victim or the witness would be unaware of the crime about
to take place and thus it would be impossible for them to meet the evidentiary requirements.
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Nor would the criminal commit his crime in the open, rather he/she would try to hide the
crime and would commit it in secrecy and obscurity, making it harder to be convicted.
Thus, Azam states that it would be impossible and detrimental to apply these standards for
the crimes of rape, theft, brigandry, or murder.111 Moreover, this ratio effectively legalized
women’s second-class position in society by making the worth of her testimony half of that
of a man’s.
However, as Qureshi points out, the context of Zia-Ul-Haq’s introduction of the
Ordinance was to bring Zina in line with the Quran and the Sunnah, but the patriarchal and
cultural interpretation of the text resulted in a skewed enforcement of it in Pakistan. The
Quran expressed displeasure with the individuals committing zina (adultery), but the
quadruple witness testimony needed to prove that sexual intercourse took place was to
deter and minimize worldly punishment for the crime by the people and the state.112 This
point is further enforced by looking at the evidentiary restrictions which are that a) the
witness has to be mature, sane, and with a morally upstanding character, b) if in any way
the defendant’s privacy had been violated, then the testimony would be invalid. Moreover,
a statute of limitations has also been prescribed for Zina, based on the Hedaya (a twelfth
century text by the leading Muslim jurist Burhan al-Din al-Marghinani.113
Under the British Common law which was practiced before the implementation of
the Hudood Ordinance, “rape was a crime punishable against men, to be lodged against the
husband of the woman, against the man who violated her.”114 A hierarchy was built in the
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law, the woman coming after the man, as his possession rather than his partner. Quraishi
underscores how the Hudood Ordinance subsumed Zina-bil-jabr as a category of Zina, but
how unequivocally incorrect this position is; nowhere in the Quran are adultery and rape
addressed together. They are very different crimes. Rape (zina-bil-jabr) is the responsibility
of the people and the state to prevent; it is an act of violence against an individual. Adultery,
by contrast, is a consensual act between adults. Moreover, Zia ul-Haq’s Islamic postulation
would have Pakistanis believe that the rape law is rooted in Quranic injunctions or is based
on Hadith, but the language is borrowed from British Criminal Law (specifically, the old
common rape law) before the Hudood ordinance was implemented.115 The verbiage is an
exact replica of the old law, with just the addition of the evidentiary requirements proposed
for Zina. Where in the Quran the evidentiary requirements for Zina were used as a
deterrence for the state or people to accuse women or punish them, the Zina Ordinance
conflated rape with adultery, and labelled it as a hadd offence with the same evidentiary
requirements as zina, making the ordinance a tool to silence and subjugate women. It
presents an inaccurate interpretation of Islamic law.
The Zina Ordinance shifted the burden of proof that the crime of rape had happened
onto the victim rather than on the rapist to prove that it had not. The innocent until proven
guilty stance taken by the courts of law in rape cases in Pakistan became an added
impediment for victims to access justice; if the victim could not prove that they had been
raped, they were tried for Zina and in most cases were charged as being guilty.
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The Ordinance was weaponized to regulate and police women’s bodily autonomy
and sexuality. “It enabled husbands to accuse wives of adultery to exact revenge for their
seeking divorce or to use it as pretext for contracting second marriages themselves. Law
enforcement officers extorted bribes from couples who could not prove their marital status.
Activists were confronted by many allegations of physical abuse and rape during police
custody of the women accused of committing zina.”116 In Shahnaz Khan’s essay on women
incarcerated based on Zina laws in Pakistan, she highlights the impossibility of finding any
woman who had been incarcerated under the Zina Ordinance and was free to talk about her
experiences. There are two major reasons for this; First, “Women who go back to their
families after being released are prevented from making outside contact.”117 In most cases
their families are the ones who have charged them with Zina and going home would be a
death sentence, so they disappear and start a new life for themselves somewhere far away.
Second, the process of incarceration destroys the woman’s place in society by labelling her
as immoral and impure, thus, the women try to distance themselves from their past. 118 They
become the silenced, invisible victims of the state and society. The women’s “axis of
power” which is based on their class and social capital is defined by the severity of the
punishment meted out by the state and society. 119

Conclusion
Since Pakistan’s inception parameters of religion have been politically shifted and
reinterpreted by different governments and opposition parties to benefit themselves. There
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is no static understanding of Islam that has been used to form the legal or cultural
understanding of what the religion constitutes. Historical, patriarchal, and culturally
misogynistic interpretations of Islam have been applied to gain maximum power and win
the right to rule, which is mostly based on the exclusion of women and religious minorities.
Muslimness was formalized through its constitution as a foundational a part of the state of
Pakistan.
The intertwining of gender and religion became more pronounced during the
electoral politics of 1964, by Fatima Ali Jinnah and later in Benazir Bhutto’s case in 1990.
In both cases, the Muslim clergy presented views on female leadership that benefitted them,
highlighting the fact that religious interpretation is politically motivated and is neither static
nor set in stone. Moreover, to gain political clout Benazir Bhutto as the first female Prime
Minister of Pakistan, embraced the patriarchal and narrow definition of womanhood that
had been promulgated under Zia’s regime by overtly performing her Muslimness. As
Farida Shaheed reasons,
In essentialist identity politics, symbols and signifiers resonating with people's
lived realities, or collective identities, are harnessed to promote political agendas
frequently couched in a religious idiom, but also in the idiom of ethnicity, culture,
and race. If many are seduced by the discourses, many others may hesitate to reject
such an agenda because to do so feels like rejecting essential parts of their own
identity (e.g., faith or culture). Both tendencies are visible in Pakistan.120
Zia- Ul- Haq’s Islamization project utilized religion to legitimize his rule. Under
the Zina Ordinance, zina (adultery) and zina-bil-jabr (rape) became intertwined terms.
Shahnaz Khan describes the Zina Ordinance as existing between religion, politics, and
culture. This mixture of religion, with politics and culture, also redefines how it is practiced
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in real life. In turn, there is an “overwhelming emphasis of politico-religious elements on
punitive law [to] pare down the faith of Islam to Muslim jurisprudence.”121 Khan
emphasizes that the Zina Ordinance is not only against the “constitution of Pakistan, but as
many [scholars] have argued, the spirit of Islam.”122 The Ordinance is used as a mechanism
to exert more control over the lives of women (expanded in chapter 4). Hence, to truly
understand the plight of women, focus must shift to their stories in their own words. By
using the lens of situated citizenship, the lived reality of rights given, and rights performed
can be highlighted.
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Chapter 4. Systems of Oppression

There are systems of oppression on the micro, meso and macro level at play in
Pakistan, institutionalized in patriarchal norms that normalize and legitimize explicitly or
implicitly violence against women. These systems range from the domain of the family to
community, social, legal, and political, disadvantaging and reinforcing the secondary status
of women as citizens. These oppressive regimes are embedded in the very fabric of the
country, performed through the laws and language of the country.
Women as independent individuals threaten the pre-determined social order and are
disciplined and punished for deviating from the stereotype of a good Muslim women by
the state and society. Women taking autonomy of their sexuality destabilizes the neatly
demarcated categories of nation, state, home, and family. Women in different social
locations and existing on different axes of power highlight how citizenship is situated in
different contexts. Current Feminist scholarship posits that women’s sexual agency is seen
as a threat to the middle-class notion of home and family. Daughters’ refusal to submit to
patriarchal control of their fathers and brothers in marriage poses a challenge to the cultural
hierarchy inherent in state and society. Amina Jamal uses M. Jacqui Alexander’s concept
of ‘erotic autonomy’ to delineate the state’s role in controlling the private as well as the
public domains of an individual’s life, and based on this, different categories of citizens
and woman are constructed.123 Women are not a monolithic category as discussed in
previous chapters; social markers delineate their position in society. A woman who
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transgresses social boundaries of class, kin, sect, religion to exercise her own sexual
autonomy is categorized as a major threat to the state and society.
Shahnaz Khan’s fieldwork (1998-2002) in which she conducted interviews of
inhabitants of a Dar-ul Aman (a woman’s shelter), reiterates this point.124 She highlights
how women incarcerated under Zina are impossible to reach as in most cases their families
are the ones that have filed a case against them. The father of seventeen-year-old GulBaden
Bibi sold her in marriage to a fifty-year-old landlord for 20,000 rupees when she was 15.
This is her story in her own words.
He used to beat me and yell at me and call me names. So, my father helped me
obtain a divorce and paid back the 20,000 to Akram. Then I married my cousin and
father consented. Father drinks alcohol and gambles and takes opium and has a lot
of debt. So he now wants me to divorce my cousin and marry a man in Karachi who
is willing to pay for me. This way father can pay off his debt. I refused. I want to
stay with my husband Qamar. Father said that there is no marriage between my
cousin and myself as I no longer have his permission to be married to Qamar. So,
he charged me with zina. I came to Darul-Aman voluntarily. I was afraid of what
my father would do to me [as I have not agreed to his demands].125
The story of 21-year-old Salima is much like that of Gulbaden. Salima’s mother
and brothers promised her in marriage to an older man as a way of paying off a debt. They
beat her to make her acquiesce to their wishes, but she resisted and ran away. She says:
I refused and they beat me more. So I ran away and stayed with a friend for four
days. I hid in her balcony and her parents did not know I was in the house. In those
days I had no food only what my friend was able to sneak in, mostly tea and some
bread. My friend was afraid of her family finding out…I want to live with my aunt
[father's sister] and she says that she will take me in. My mother and brothers have
told me that if I don't come home, they will charge me with theft and zina. I have
no lawyer and I have no money. If I go home, they will kill me. I am happy here
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and I will live out my life in Darul-Aman if I must. I will show my family that I can
survive.126
Gulbaden and Salima’s story underline the consequences women face when
exercising sexual autonomy. Women’s bodies are claimed under the guise of law and
morality. The Zina Ordinance is weaponized by the patriarchy to stifle women’s sexual
autonomy. The woman’s right to choose her own partner categorizes her as licentious and
promiscuous, at odds with the pure, domesticated woman, who should be devoid of desire
and want.

4.1 Parallel Legal Systems at Play - Muktaran Bibi’s Case
Pakistan’s legal system is a mix of secular and religious laws. The multiple and
parallel legal systems in place, systematically build impunity for crimes against women,
making it next to impossible for them to get justice. By focusing on the primary data
collected, trajectories of injustice can be traced to highlight the uneven experience of
democracy by women on ground. Mukhtaran Mai’s experience sheds light on the failed
promise of equality.
On June 22, 2002, Mukhataran Bibi was gang raped by four men and paraded naked
in her village Meerwala, Pakistan. This was done on the order of the elders of a tribal
council in revenge for her younger brother’s alleged affair with a woman from the affluent
Mastoi tribe. Bibi’s brother was twelve at the time of the incident. He claimed the
accusation was an attempt to silence him from revealing that he had been sodomized by
Mastoi men. Moreover, Bibi’s family from the poorer Gujjar tribe maintained that their son
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had committed no wrong. In my interview with Mukhtaran Bibi, she said, “My father gave
me to them [Mastoi men] to save his son.”127
On August 31, 2002, the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) found six of the twelve
accused guilty of the gang rape of Mukhtaran Bibi. Sentencing one of the accused to the
death penalty. However, as death penalties are subject to appellate review, the Lahore High
court stepped in and exonerated all but one of the accused, who had admitted to being
married to Mukhtaran Bibi and had failed to present any evidence to support this claim.
The High Court awarded him a life sentence based on this. “After the Lahore High Court
rendered its decision, a justice of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) stepped in suo moto and
suspended the High Court’s decision. He did so because the High Court had interfered with
the FSC’s constitutional jurisdiction over questions of Hudood.”128 The Supreme Court
(SC), Pakistan’s highest legal authority stepped in to stem a jurisdictional battle over a
highly visible case. Mukhtaran Bibi’s case had created an uproar nationally and
internationally. Thus, the state wanted to deal with it quickly.
Much to the horror of the world, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s
decision and acquitted all but one. The Court stated that the five who had been acquitted
“enjoy a triple presumption of innocence without ever defining the term or explaining the
burden of proof it entails.”129 However, there was a positive, the judgment passed by the
Supreme Court was upheld two to one. The two judges, Justice Saqib Nisar and Justice
Shakirullah Jan reiterated the points of law that emphasized the weakness of the
prosecution’s case, highlighting the eight-day delay in the filing of the case, the absence of
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medical evidence, and the lack of ‘ocular evidence.’130 Thus, it couldn’t be established if
Bibi had been raped by one or many men. Moreover,
The SC majority judgment further based its acquittal on the inconsistencies and
improvements in the statements of prosecution witnesses suggesting that they had
been tutored by the council. The court pointed out the contradiction between the
statements which weakened the prosecution's case. Most of the discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the statements revolved around whether Bibi emerged from the
room naked, or semi-naked and whether her clothes were torn, and her trousers
were in her hand or on her body. There was a detailed cross-examination over
whether she was handed her trousers inside the room after the rape or outside, if
she had them on or not and whether her clothes were stained with semen. Bibi had
to reply to humiliating and demeaning questions about being nude, whether her
trousers were torn on the sides and if the string of her trousers had broken during
the rape. She was asked whether or not the accused had pulled her trousers down
before being raped if it was true that her father had thrown her clothes on her and
so on.131
This despicable line of questioning acts as a major deterrent for women to report
rape crimes. The victim-survivors are forced to relive their trauma and forced to defend
themselves in front of a patriarchal audience. The judges discredited Bibi’s statements
based on the encoded logic of the legal system of social-cultural imperatives and
evidentiary requirements.132 Thus, effectively silencing and rejecting Bibi’s own
experience of violence. By doing so the judicial system failed her on multiple levels as a
citizen, by denying her justice and placing her within the category of the unreliable female
witness.
Moreover, the state legitimized violence against Bibi by granting acquittals to all
but one of the accused. Moreover, it reinforced the power of the informal channels of
authority like jirgas and panchayats. There is an “implicit collusion between the multiple
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and parallel systems that came into play in various judicial forums or centers of power.
Starting from the all-male jirga council of village elders, the anti-terrorist court the Lahore
High Court, and the Supreme Court, to show that impunity is systematically produced by
the legal system.”133
Nevertheless, Muktharan Bibi’s case negates the usual “scripted narrative” by
highlighting a particular moment in time.134 Her case got a two-to-one Supreme Court
judgment, the majority judgment followed the pre-given evidentiary script but the
judgment by the dissenting justice Nasir-Ul-Mulk proved that this script could be
challenged and changed.
The judge, Nasir-Ul-Mulk emphasized the need to situate the case within the
cultural and social context and focus on the axis of power on which Bibi’s case was located
that are caste, class, financial, and gender-based rules; that added to the delayed filing of
the First Information Report (FIR) as well as the evidentiary flaws in the case.135 His
judgment shows that there is a path forward, a path where women can be humanized. Mulk
challenged the static nature of law in Pakistan by contesting the evidentiary norms of the
case and stating the need to assess each case within its particular context. By doing this, he
“centered Bibi’s experience of violence, and averred that as a victim of the crime (the
woman) is the most informed and credible witness of the incident.”136
Bibi’s case highlights the on-ground reality of the hurdles and obstacles women
face to access justice that range from the social, to the civil, to the political. Maria Tahir’s
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rape case took place in 2015, thirteen years after Bibi’s but there has been little to no change
in the patterns of violence committed by the state to silence women. Here is her truth.

4.2 A Close Look at Maria Tahir’s Case
The conviction rate in cases involving rape is under three percent. Formal and
informal avenues are used to silence victims. Maria Tahir, who was gang-raped in 2015,
sheds light on this through her lived experience. Maria Tahir was born and raised in Multan
and was wed to a family residing in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). One of the main
reasons for staying in Bhimber, a town in Azad Kashmir, was Tahir’s commitment to
education, as she states that in the village there is no access to quality education and
teachers do not come to the school for months at times.137
In 2015, Tahir was gang raped by men affiliated with the minister of AJK.
According to her, it is an organized crime ring that gang rapes women, makes video tapes
of the act and then blackmails them using the videos. The rapists threatened to circulate
her videos online and to show them to her husband; besieged by terror, she complied with
their demands and kept sending them money. Their demands kept getting bigger and bigger
starting from PKR 200,000; they reached up to PKR 1.5 million when they kidnapped her
son threatening to kill him if she failed to meet their demands. She paid them the money
by selling her jewelry and borrowing money from her father, but the demands kept on
coming. Her spirit broke and she tried to commit suicide; she miraculously survived. This
is when she finally confided in her husband.
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Trust in Pakistan’s judicial systems is next to non-existent, thus Tahir and her
family decided to approach one of the rapist’s uncles who was a Major in the Pakistan
Army. Tahir said that her husband told her, “We will not get justice through the courts,
because these are powerful people.”138 By following an informal channel of justice, they
had hoped to get the perpetrators punished swiftly and have the blackmail money returned
to them soon. The Major said that this would be resolved in 5 days.
However, on the fourth day Tahir and her son were kidnapped and taken to Gujrat,
a city almost an hour’s drive away. Tahir was beaten and raped by 2 men again as a
punishment for speaking up against them. She begged them to let her go, the rapists
acquiesced on the condition that she take back her allegations and never speak of them
again.
Tahir says that they threw her and her son on a road where she begged a bus driver
to take her back to Bhimber. She called her husband to pick up their son, and that she had
given up and would commit suicide. Her husband begged her to stay put and arrived with
the police. The police took her directly to the police station; in a dark room, the Sub
Inspector Tariq Sulehriya, conducted Tahir’s interrogation alone. She said, “He would
remove my chador to see the torn clothes below, he made a spectacle of me.”139 Tahir stated
that her husband said that taking her to the police station in that condition was akin to
dishonoring her twice.
After her interrogation, she was taken to the hospital to have her medico-legal
examination done. The hospital asked her to pay a fee of PKR 22,000 to have an urgent
examination conducted. The medico-legal examination is supposed to be done free of
138
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charge; asking Tahir to pay such a high fee (which many won’t be able to pay) is an added
deterrence in victim’s access to justice.

Fig.2. The medical legal form to be filled as evidence of rape.140

They went back to get an FIR (First Incident Report) written, but the police officers
delayed them by saying, we will write it when the Deputy Superintendent comes. When
finally, the DSP arrived, he called the main accused, Haroon Rashid, and instead of treating
him like a criminal, talked to him with deference, calling him ‘Sir’ as a sign of respect.
Affiliated with the current minister of AJK Chaudhry Tariq Farooq, a mob of around 25
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men came to the police station to take her to a panchayat.141 Tahir did not want to go to the
panchayat, but she says “Bhimber police dropped off, me, my husband and all our family
to the panchayat. Regardless of our wishes.”142 They knew no justice would be meted out
there.
The panchayat lasted for nineteen days during which Tahir’s videos were shown to
the crowd on two different laptops and the rapists admitted that they did rape her. But after
the nineteen days, the panchayat, along with the Bhimber police, forcefully made them sign
a ‘Raazi Nama’ which the Bhimber police stamped with their official seal. 143
Tahir fought for justice for seven long years, trying all channels to get justice.
However, it was all to no avail. Tahir stated “Pakistan has failed me as a citizen. The state
instruments colluded with the criminals to silence me.”144
Tahir’s harrowing story highlights the denial of equal citizenship. By using situated
citizenship, one can see the lived reality of the gap between rights given and rights
performed. Tahir went from police officers to bureaucrats to courts, and even went through
informal channels to get justice, but she was repudiated at every turn.

4.3 Control and Honor
A Muslim female citizen must contend with a hierarchy of control, starting with the
state and moving on to family, community, and society. There is a clear trend observed in
the primary data collected, of the state colluding with formal courts of law along with
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multiple and parallel legal systems (like jirgas and panchayats) to uphold and re-enforce
patriarchal practices which legitimize the secondary status of women as citizens.
In 2021, based on police reports, there were 5,279 rapes (including gang- rape) and
478 honor killings registered in the country. Women are confronted with violence in both
private and public domains. The idea of honor has been deeply intertwined with the psyche
of Muslim manhood since pre-partition times. Muslim Womanhood was constructed to
safeguard Muslim manhood; “women protected the precarious and fearful masculinity of
Muslim Males by assuring them that they protected them!”145 The idea of women seen in
relation to men has been historically ingrained in the cultural consciousness. Ideas of
nation, home, and Muslimness are entrenched in the honor of the woman which is
attributed to her chasteness. It becomes the family’s and patriarch’s duty to protect the
honor of their women, hence legitimizing the use of force and coercion to obtain this goal.
Protection of honor means complete control over the choices of women. This
‘protection’ effectively encompasses every facet of the woman’s life to make sure it falls
within the parameters of acceptable behavior in society. Education, mobility, clothes,
inheritance, choice of partner all fall within this purview. “When the honor of a man, his
family, tribe or the community is vested in the actions of the woman, strict control over her
becomes a necessity, and any deviation, real or perceived, has to be crushed immediately
and decisively.”146
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Even though the honor of the nation/family is vested in the woman, she has no
authority over her own actions. Her lot in life is to follow the dictates laid down by her
family and society; any aberration from the rules will get her severely punished or even
killed. Once the family’s perceived honor has been tarnished, whether the woman is guilty
or innocent of any transgressions becomes secondary, and the only way of restoring honor
is by killing the one who impeached it (i.e., the woman).147 Therefore, in most cases of
violence against women, the victim’s family is behind it.
The case of Qandeel Baloch is one such example. Qandeel Baloch, erroneously
dubbed as ‘Pakistan’s Kim Kardashian,’ was famous for stirring up controversy by posting
provocative content on social media. However, this label blurs the context from which she
operated. Coming from a small, labor class family situated in Southern Punjab, she did not
have wealth or social capital protecting her. Moreover, she financially supported her
family.
Qandeel made headlines after she promised to do a strip tease online if Pakistan
won the T20 Cricket World Cup. She, along with the Islamic scholar Mufti Qavi, made an
appearance on a show where the host goaded the cleric to react to Qandeel’s promise. The
cleric maintained a stoic show of religiosity and asked to meet Qandeel if she was ever in
Karachi. A few weeks after this, pictures of Qandeel and the Mufti Qavi surfaced together.
In a short video shot by Baloch using a selfie stick, the mullah says he is happy to have
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been visited by the model and hopes to offer her “guidance on issues related to religion…I
will be guiding Qandeel Baloch, and I am hopeful she will listen to me,” Qavi declared.148
Pakistan and its people were transfixed by Qandeel Baloch and the remarkable
refutation of values and religious sentiment of the people. The media rabidly reported on
the cleric Qavi’s and Qandeel’s meeting, which ultimately got him removed from his
position on the Ruet-e-Hilal committee (Moon sighting committee which announces the
sighting of the moon for an end to the holy month of Ramazan and fixes the date for Eid
ul-Fitr). Qandeel went on to expose the cleric’s fake religiosity to the AFP reporter Issam
Ahmed. She said, “He is a blot on the name of Islam…Who is he to claim to be a guardian
of the faith?”149
After this, Qavi hinted in an appearance on national TV that Qandeel Baloch was
using an alias and she hailed from Multan. This led to her real name and her community
being exposed. Her family and village were hounded by media personnel. Now that the
entire country knew which community the young starlet was from, a lot of vitriol was
thrown their way. Members of the community ostracized and mocked Qandeel’s family as
having their honor besmirched. Not just the Baloch family, but the name of the entire
community had been tarnished.
When a woman exercises independent freedom to act, she disturbs this conception,
and the male responsible for controlling her becomes ‘ungendered’. A man may be
considered effeminate by his peers if he does not take authoritative action to reassert his authority over a transgressing woman; it is through an act of violence
toward the woman that he demonstrates the power of his masculinity.150

148

Boone, “Feared No One.”
Boone, “Feared No One.”
150
Khan, “Sexual Violence,” 6.
149

64

Shortly after her identity was revealed in 2016, Qandeel’s brother Waseem Azeem
killed her, confessed on national television to strangling her to death in her house, in the
name of honor. When Waseem was questioned if he was ashamed of his crime, he
remorselessly replied, “No, we are Baloch.”151 According to him, he had restored the honor
of the Baloch tribe and of his family. Policing a woman’s sexuality by using violence is
justified for the reason of maintaining a morally pure society based on norms and traditions
of the community.
The state is also complicit in this, as it aids and abets the violence by turning a blind
eye to the legal loopholes that allow the criminals to go free. “The boundaries of the legal
system in force within Pakistan are blurred because of its interaction with a host of other
factors that include custom, culture, and religion. This interplay manifests itself both in the
enactment of legislation and its subsequent interpretation and enforcement by the state.”152
The honor-killing law was seen as an ineffective tool to stop this crime. An
amendment to the law was added two months after Qandeel’s murder. This amendment
stipulated that the murderer could not be pardoned by the victim’s family and that it was a
crime against the state, whereas before the family of the victim (in this case Qandeel’s own
family) could simply pardon the killer, her brother. After serving less than six years in
prison for her murder and confessing to the murder, Waseem Azeem has been acquitted.153
The story of Kainat Soomro shows another side to the imagined dishonoring of the
community and family, underscoring the effects of deviating from the patriarchal norms.
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Kainat Soomro, a 13-year-old girl was gang-raped on her way back from school in 2007.
Here is Kainat’s story in her own words is as follows:
After I escaped and returned home, my brother took me to the police station to file
a complaint and get these men arrested. At first, the police sided with the village
leaders and refused to act. In our village, we have a tribal justice system run by
powerful village leaders. They said they wanted to declare me an ‘outlaw’. Then
they warned my brother and father that they should kill me.154
Rape victims are also considered as bringing dishonor to the family/community, as
they are considered impure and defiled. However, defying the customs and traditions of
their community, Kainat’s family refused to cast her out of their home, or to kill her or
settle the matter in the local jirga.155 Instead, they supported her fight for justice. To silence
the victim-survivor, Kainat’s older brother Sabir Soomro was flooded with threats to kill
his sister in the name of honor.156 Sabir Soomro said, “They told me I am not a real man.
They said, ‘You failed to follow your traditions’, ‘You failed to kill your sister’, ‘You
should have followed our customs!”157 The society emasculated Sabir Soomro for not
choosing violence against his sister. According to their community, there was more honor
in killing Kainat than in supporting her legal battle.
The logic behind this reasoning is that by taking this case to court, they would
expose the entire community to shame and disgrace, and that the perceived dishonor
tarnishing Kainat’s family would transition into dishonoring of the whole community. By
accepting criminal behavior like that of Waseem Azeem, the society/ state enables rapists
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and murderers. When there is any deviation from the tradition of silencing the victim, as
happened with Sabir Soomro, the victims or their family pays the price. Kainat’s brother
Sabir Soomro was killed by unknown personnel three years after Kainat’s case had started.
Kainat and her family allege that the murderers of her brother are her rapists.
Thus, failing to conform to the role of a hyper-masculine, neo-colonial man is also
fraught with danger. Hyper-masculinity is rewarded and accepted by the state and society.
Waseem Azeem and Sabir Soomro’s fates were decided based on the principles of
communal honor and their reaction to its tarnishing.

4.4 Deconstructing Language
Women’s inability to receive justice is clouded by the terminology embedded in
our social fabric. Language reveals the multi-faceted biases and internalized prejudices
within us. Even while resisting the exclusionary inclusion of the state/ society, we operate
from within this paradigm which inevitably leads to a repetition and re-enforcement of
patriarchal attitudes.
My interviews with Tahir and Mukhtaran Bibi shed light on this phenomenon.
During the 1 hour and 30-minute interview with Mukhtaran Bibi, not once did Bibi frame
the events by calling it a gang rape.158 In our conversation, she referred to it as a ‘waqya’
(an incident). The concept of shame is deeply intertwined with rape in society, as most
victims are expected to commit suicide rather than to live with the continued shame and
stigma attached to them. Mukhtaran Bibi and Maria Tahir both tried to commit suicide at
one point in their struggles.
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By opting to use ambiguous language, Bibi tried to distance herself from the stigma.
"While the alleged rapist is innocent in the eyes of the law till proven guilty, the victim is
presumed to be guilty until she proves her innocence.”159 Even though Mukhtaran Bibi’s
rapists were convicted by the Anti-Terrorism court in 2002, 5 men out of 6 (4 rapists and
2 of the jurors of the panchayat) have been acquitted over the course of the years on grounds
of insufficient evidence.160
Tahir also started the conversation with calling her rape, ‘ijtimai zayati’161 a term
colloquially used for gang rape; its literal translation is ‘collective wrong-doing’. In the
qualitative survey conducted of 46 people (31 women and 15 men), when asked about the
terminology or words used for gendered violence against women in everyday life, the
respondents shared terms such as ‘Izzat lootna’ (loss of honor), ‘Izzat cheen li gyi’ (honor
taken away), ‘Izzat pe haath daal diya’ (an idiom that means to attack someone’s honor),
‘zayati’ (wrong-doing), ‘zina bil-jabr’ (fornication by force). All these terms obfuscate the
reality of the crime and criminal, leaving the victim-survivor to grapple with the enormity
of the crime committed against them. Even the words become taboo. As Tahir stated:
ﮨﻤﺎرا ﺟﻮ ﻣﻌﺸﺮا ﮨﯿﻨﺎ اﮔﺮ ﻣﯿﺮے ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮐﭽﮭ ﺑﺮا ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ وه ﻟﻮگ ﺑﺮا ﮐﮩﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ ﻣﺠﮭﮯ اﺗﻨﺎ ﻣﺠﺒﻮر ﮐﺮ دﯾﮟ ﮔﯿﮯ
ﮐﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﭽﮭ ﺑﻮﻟﻮں ھﯽ ﻧﺎ۔ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺑﮍا ﻗﺼﻮر وار ﮨﯿﻨﺎ وه ﮨﮯ ﮨﻤﺎرا ﻣﻌﺸﺮا ﺟﻮ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﮐﭽﮭ ﺑﻮﻟﻨﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮭﯿﮟ
دﯾﺘﺎ۔ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﮐﭽﮭ ﮐﮩﻨﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮭﯿﮟ دﯾﺘﺎ۔
If something bad happens to me, our society will blame me for it. They will push
me to such an extent that I will not be able to speak. The main problem in our
society is that we are not allowed to speak. We are not allowed to talk.
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Moreover, Tahir’s language was couched within the patriarchal structure. By
evoking the imagery of the investigating police officer’s mother and sister, she was
reinforcing the accepted notion of honor interlinked with women. She said, “I asked the
police officer, don’t you have a mother or sister at your home?” She further stated that
when she asked the police to look at her bank statements to show the payments made as
she was blackmailed, she questioned them which woman would have such financial
transactions with men and for what purpose? Statements like this underline the strictly
demarcated segregation of the sexes and how inconceivable it is for women to operate
within the public sphere.
When I asked Tahir, if any cases had been registered by any one before her, she
averred “Sharif gharanay ke larkiyaan kuch nahien kehti” (the girls of respected
households don’t say anything).162 We are socially taught a good woman is one that is
invisible. This deeply ingrained social belief has been normalized in the local vernacular
as ‘Ghar ke baat ghar mein rahay” (what happens inside the home should remain private),
“ghar ke izzat” (the respect of the household). It is used, as one respondent says, “as a way
to manipulate, isolate and attempt to brainwash or gaslight women,” while another
shares, “It's one of many cultural norms used to control and subjugate women. Yes,
women in my social circle have experienced this attitude.”
Ninety percent of the female respondents said that they have experienced such
internalized misogynistic attitudes and that it is prevalent in society or that they know
of someone who has been silenced by using such tactics. The male respondents all
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condemned the culture of silence except one who said, “I suppose so. I think everybody
would like to keep the dark closets in their life private/closed.”163
There is a trickle-down effect of the attitudes exhibited in our society; when
politicians normalize rape and paint women as conniving, deceitful creatures, there are
on ground repercussions for them.
In 2005, Mukhtaran Bibi’s case was getting a lot of international attention, in an
interview with the Washington Post, the 10th president of Pakistan, General Musharaff,
said, “You must understand the environment in Pakistan ... This has become a moneymaking concern. A lot of people say if you want to go abroad and get a visa for Canada or
citizenship and be a millionaire, get yourself raped.”164 These attitudes about women as
liars and unreliable narrators predates the creation of Pakistan (Chapter 2) and has seeped
into the fabric of the nation itself. The attitudes of the bureaucrats and individuals in power
are reflective of the ideologies of the masses.
Women are branded as sexual deviants and blamed for the rise in sexual violence
against them. In an interview with ‘Axios on HBO’ Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan,
said, “If a woman is wearing very few clothes, it will have an impact on the men, unless
they are robots. It’s just common sense.”165 In his tenure he repeatedly put the onus on
women for stopping rape against them saying on national TV, “Women should remove
temptations for men, because not everyone has will power.” He went on to say, “women
should observe purdah.”166

163

Questionnaires.
“Musharraf’s Remarks.”
165
“Woman will wear.”
166
“Imran Khan criticized.”
164

70

Such language casts women as seductresses, tempting men from the righteous path.
Thinking like this magnifies violence against women as any transgression from the social
norm merits punishment. And those who deviate from the defined parameters are seen as
fair play.

Conclusion
By looking at the stories of women on ground we can see the failed promise of
equality and the state’s legitimization of violence against women by granting impunity to
the perpetrators. The stories of women discussed highlight a relational identity of women.
Women like Mukhtaran Bibi are found culpable of crimes of their male kin. They are
refused by the state and the community to be seen as autonomous individuals under the
idea of male ownership of female bodies. Zina is used by male patriarchs to exert their
control over the agency of women. Sexual violence and honor killing can be seen as an
extension of this control. The state colludes with the perpetrators by ensuring leniency “in
the form of reduced sentences and even exemptions for individuals accused of honor
crimes…the formal justice is complicit in reinforcing mechanisms of control that on
occasion also contravene women’s rights.”167
While such tragic stories highlight the plight of women in a deeply patriarchal
society like Pakistan, there are also other stories out there. In these cases, women shed the
role of passive, helpless observers assigned to them, and instead take on the part of active
participants in movements that have great consequences for their own involvement in both
public and private affairs. Sometimes this takes the form of lone rangers fighting it out in
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pursuit of justice, other times it takes the form of an entire movement, a collective jointly
bargaining for their rights and their place in Pakistani society.
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Chapter 5. Reclaiming Citizenship

Even as the odds are stacked against female citizens in Pakistan, we can see that
women are working towards reclaiming their rights as equal citizens by looking at
movements where women play a critical part in advancing a narrative of strength. They are
resisting and pushing to gain autonomy and agency, sometimes through religion and at
others by collective organization. Women led movements are discredited in Pakistan by
being labelled as the domain of the privileged. My research proves that this is not true,
women from all spheres of life are agents of change and are actively resisting the status of
second-class citizens in their own social context.

5.1 Women as Agents of Change
The lived reality of gendered citizenship in Pakistan has led to some interesting
outcomes and alliances, as women try to claim more agency and autonomy in their
everyday lives which has led to curious unions. One such instance is the early support a
cleric named Mullah Fazlullah garnered from women in his demand for the imposition of
Sharia law across the Swat valley in Pakistan. This seems on the face of it counterintuitive,
since most of the burden and restrictions of such a system falls on women themselves, but
the support was meaningful.
In her book Faith and Feminism in Pakistan: Religious Agency or Secular
Autonomy? Afiya Zia uses the takeover of the Swat region of Pakistan by Mullah Fazlullah
– his demand for imposition of Sharia Law, an act later sanctioned legislatively by the
Pakistani Parliament – to argue against the simplistic narratives advanced by certain
authors to explain this seminal event. Zia extensively quotes Nazish Brohi’s firsthand
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research, including interviewing the women of Swat to push back against the ideas
advanced by Humeira Iqtidar, who relies on secondary sources research to frame Mullah
Fazlullah “as a kind of Che Guevara, leading a revolution that resonated with the historical
peasant uprisings in the region.”168
Women were early supporters of Mullah Fazlullah, nicknamed ‘Mullah Radio,’ for
his use of an illegal radio station to broadcast his message across the Swat valley. However,
the distinction between religiosity as an abstract notion and its actual implementation as a
rigid set of rules mostly detrimental to women is an important one. As stated by Zia,
women’s early support for Fazlullah stemmed from the former abstract notion, as they
failed to grasp the real-world consequences of the system proposed by the cleric, once it
was implemented. This view is reinforced by the fact made plain by Nazish Brohi’s
interviews of local women in Swat. Brohi notes that the women, some of whom had prior
experience in local governance by way of being councilors, “had not read any literature on
the Sharia and were not familiar with any Islamic scholars on the subject or the debates
over interpretations.”169
Nazish Brohi’s interviews show that many women saw the application of Islamic
law as an opportunity to gain agency in everyday affairs, using the framework of religious
law. Mullah Fazlullah, through his broadcast, spoke directly to them and won their support
through promises of more independence within the domestic sphere. For these women, the
demand for Sharia “also symbolized a stand-in for justice, development, progress, and
peace … Fazlullah convinced them that the Sharia law provides for this in literal terms.

168
169

Zia, Faith and Feminism, 159.
Zia, Faith and Feminism, 160-161.

74

For these women, Islamic history held the promise of economic prosperity and social
cohesion for Muslims.”170
Another reason for women’s support of Fazlullah was his acknowledgement of their
contributions to the movement early on. Women felt seen and heard. Fazlullah “would
announce the contributions to his cause that women had collected together in his radio
broadcasts, as well as acknowledging individual contributions, whether of gold or
money.”171 Such public recognition led to women achieving a status in the wider
community that had never been accorded to them before and gave them importance that
had been denied to them within their own households, since all important decisions were
made by the men. This was in direct contrast to the message of Fazlullah who “created a
discourse in which women were positioned as the most important decision-makers.”172
Fazlullah’s reign in Swat, which was codified legislatively by the Parliament in the
form of Nizam-e-Adl regulation,173 came to an end when the military was forced to
intervene. When the influence of Sharia Law began to spread beyond the Swat region,
Taliban were showing up to enforce Sharia law in adjoining areas, including Buner region,
situated an hour’s drive from the Capital Islamabad. Brohi followed up her initial research
in 2011 when she returned to Swat, two years after the military operation to oust Fazlullah
and his militia had ended. Views had changed drastically by then:
They spoke of the horrors and brutality they had witnessed against their family and
community and said that “such ruthless tortures could not have been inspired by
religion and that its invocation was a farce.” They referred to Fazlullah as “the fitna
(chaos) who had brought azaab (tribulations) onto them.174
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Brohi concluded that “through discussions among themselves, they were able to
state in hindsight that a significant motivation for them was being given the public
recognition as important actors – the notion of agency.”175
This chapter of female participation in the public realm presents a remarkable
account of the notions of gendered citizenship. The routine situation was that the women
of Swat were invisible, as in much of the rest of the country, but a change in political
environment had enabled them to find a voice and have a say in public affairs, at least
initially. Even though this took the form of an Islamist system based on misogynistic
interpretation and enactment of Sharia law, the motivations of women in supporting this
system had little to do with religion. The support stemmed from being given a greater role
in both the public and private sphere.
Another point of interest here is that while men were found to support Mullah
Fazlullah because of his promise of speedy justice, for women this point was irrelevant, as
they had rarely, if ever, gotten the chance to seek justice using the State apparatus. Their
disagreements were almost always settled at home, and when they did try to protest, they
were quickly silenced. Their support of this short-lived experiment thus stems from getting
a greater say in the running of the household, the potential for greater prosperity, and a
more stable future where they could claim more ground and be relatively more
autonomous, it allowed them greater agency. To achieve this, they were willing to give an
Islamic system a chance, even though they would pay the highest price for this experiment.
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5.2 Reclaiming Power through Organization
Far from being passive actors, women in Pakistan have always taken the chance to
claim agency and some measure of control over their lives when presented with the
opportunity to do so. One such opportunity presented itself with the Local Government
Ordinance 2001. It was introduced by Pervez Musharraf, a military dictator who later
appointed himself President. This law reserved 33% of seats at all tiers of local government
for women. It further reserved 17% of seats for women in Provincial and National
Assemblies. It was a very promising measure for women to become part of the governance
at the local level as well as in the legislative process. Increasing the representation in the
public domain would allow greater visibility and access to opportunities for the larger
female population. Thus, 36,105 women became part of the formal local government in the
first round of elections in 2002.176
There were numerous critiques of these measures. It was pointed out that women
were being used to project a liberal image of a military dictator, that many women acted as
proxies for their male relatives also involved in the political process, i.e., supported the
males by shoring up their power, and that lots of women simply had no experience when
it came to the affairs of state and how to run them.177 Women also faced a lot of resistance
by male politicians whom they had to work with every day, and who were still in a majority.
However, the Local Government Ordinance was unprecedented in its scale as it led to the
opening of the public sphere to women in a way unimaginable before.
Women themselves were acutely aware of such shortcomings, which led to the
formation of the Women Councilor’s Network (WCN), an organization akin to a union
176
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which allowed all women in local governance to speak with a collective voice. The WCN
also played other important roles, allying with NGOs to become a source for capacity
building and training. Over time, the women through those collective forums also began to
voice opinions on laws and matters not strictly related to their jobs in local governance.
The members of this organization “began to link patriarchal obstructions with state policies
(which included the discriminatory Islamic laws and procedures in cases of violence
against women) and they protested against the absence of state interest or policies for
women’s social, political, or economic equality.”178 They attended rallies, carried out
protests and essentially tried to bring women’s issues to the forefront of national politics.
The freedom with which they were allowed to do so in Punjab, the Pakistani
heartland, forms a dramatic contrast to the experience of women councilors in Northern
Pakistan, where an overlap of patriarchal, religious, social, and tribal customs allowed them
little room to make their voice heard. As Afiyah Zia argues,
In fact, before the elections in 2005, religious parties ruling the province of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa convened a meeting where an election agreement was signed by the
representatives of different parties to keep women away from contesting the polls.
In Swabi, Mardan and Dir districts, women were not just prevented from filling
their nomination paper but from even casting votes. In the Malakand division,
religious leaders gathered to declare that the Nikah (solemnization of marriage),
Namaaz-e-Janaza (funeral prayers) and all other religious rites of any women
candidates and/or, woman voter would be boycotted. Some women councilors in
Dir were prevented from carrying out their duties and the male relatives of these
women would attend council sessions on their behalf.179

This point highlights how gendered citizenship is experienced differently
depending on social locations and positionalities such as prevailing customs, norms, age,
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ethnicity, gender, and religion. These positionalities (as stated in chapter 1) are structured
around an axis of power subject to change historically. The meaning attached to these
positionalities is fluid and contested, and often based on multiple social markers, and the
meaning attached to these terms varies widely in Pakistan as it is home to many ethnicities
each with their own customs that in many cases override the actual law of the land as can
be seen in the case of Mukhtaran Bibi and Maria Tahir.
The Okara Peasant Movement of 1999 also highlights women’s role as active
agents of change. This movement originated from a dispute between tenant farmers in
Okara and the military who oversaw the lands farmers operated on. The military tried to
change the status of the farmers, who had been tilling the land for generations, from
“sharecropping tenant farmers and convert them to contract renters.”180 The farmers felt
the change in status left them not much better off than wage laborers, and with a lease term
set in the new status contracts, they could be easily evicted on short notice. The former
agreement was for the tenants to work the land and be paid a percentage of the crop harvest.
The new agreement “would also strip the peasant tenants of the protection that they enjoyed
under the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887, which among other things, gave the first right of
purchase to those who had tilled the land for more than two generations for over 20 years,
whenever the land is sold or leased.”181
The first protest against the new proposed arrangement was in October 2000, with
the farmers adopting the slogan ‘malkiyat ya maut’ (ownership or death). Shortly after this,
the men of the community were harassed and picked up by law enforcement agencies,
which is when the women stepped up to continue the movement and breathed new life into
180
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it. As a result, almost a million farmers rose to challenge the might of the largest, most
powerful agent in Pakistan – the military. This is more remarkable since farmers are one
of the most powerless sections of society in Pakistan. The State initially responded by
unleashing the Rangers, a paramilitary force, on the protestors and detaining the men, at
which point “it was the women who responded by arming themselves with thapas (thick
sticks flattened at one end used for washing clothes) and pots and pans blocking police
parties . . . Soon these women’s groups came to be known as the ‘thapa force’.”182
This ‘thapa force’ routinely protested illegal detentions of their relatives, encircled
a police station, lay down in front of police vans, attended court hearings, travelled to
multiple cities to plead their case in front of the public by taking part in seminars and
conferences. There were also injuries when law enforcement agencies responded, with one
recorded casualty. Despite being a conservative place, the women of Okara came out to
fight in place of the men, without their participation the movement would likely have
petered out. Okara also has a significant Christian population, a divide which was
overcome when women of both religions came together to participate in the protest
movement. Rubina Sagiol, as quoted by Zia, states, “when survival is at stake, religion can
take a back seat in human affairs.”183
The ‘thappa brigade’ became a woman’s collective that was inducted into the
Anjuman-e-Mazareen Party (AMP) and formed the women’s wing of the party. They
started dealing with matters not strictly related to the Okara Peasants Movement.
“According to Naz’s [secretary of the AMP] testimony, the women’s wing members of the
AMP are called when a beating occurs, and they help resolve the dispute and warn the men.
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As a result, there has allegedly been a lessening of domestic physical abuse.”184 Despite
their increasing importance in driving the Okara Peasants movement, the women are still
not consulted when making major decisions within the AMP. They are at once negotiating
and experiencing ‘exclusionary inclusion’ in multiple domains of the private and the
public.185

5.3 Autonomous Women’s Movement in Pakistan - Challenges and Obstacles
Considering the separate movements discussed above, all of which were triggered
by independent events within a local context, it is important to ask whether there is anything
approaching a uniform, overarching movement advocating for women’s rights ‒ a
movement to improve the reality of women living their lives as second-class citizens due
to the reality of patriarchal, tribal, and regional customs which invariably push the rights
of more than fifty percent of the population to the background.
In Feminism and the Women’s Movement in Pakistan: Actors, Debates and
Strategies, Rubina Saigol interviews people at the forefront of feminist causes to find the
answer. There is a distinction made between native movements responsive to and conscious
of issues faced by local women, the most visible of this being the Women’s Action Forum
(WAF) during Zia-Ul Haq’s era and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), whose
agendas, while overlapping with feminist practice, are mostly donor driven and are also
wary of antagonizing the State and inviting repercussions.
WAF was initially formed to respond to the implementation of the Hudood
Ordinance during the tenure of Zia-ul-Haq; its agenda was later expanded to advocate for

184
185

Zia, Faith and Feminism, 176.
Behl, Gendered Citizenship.

81

women’s causes and position in society. Tahira Abdullah, a well-known women’s right
activist, argues that WAF was the only organization that was made along feminist lines in
its functioning and ideology and can be called a movement.186 However, according to her,
some chapters of WAF, such as in Lahore and Islamabad, have become dormant, while
others, such as in Karachi, Hyderabad, and Peshawar, remain active. Thus, even within
WAF, a distinction needs to be made geographically. She also argues, that while there are
many different organizations fighting for women’s rights, not all of them are necessarily
functioning on feminist principles, and in any case, are quite splintered without a unity of
command structure or message, with most being isolated to geographic pockets. While Ms.
Abdullah does not consider NGOs to be autonomous or a movement in any sense, she goes
on to say:
NGOs are not movements (autonomous or otherwise) as they are mostly donorfunded with donor-driven agendas, and they are usually not free to select either
their geographic areas or thematic sectors of work ... movements are run with
passion, commitment and dedication, and with the spirit of volunteerism – not as a
salaried nine to five projects. Internally, Pakistani women’s movements are
scattered, fragmented, divided, competitive and inclined to rivalry, turf wars and
territoriality, and are neither organized nor cooperative. Many activists succumbed
to NGOisation, some out of need.187
However, “a few comparatively autonomous and independent NGOs, for example,
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, ASR (Applied Socio-economic Research
Resource Centre), Shirkat Gah, and Simorgh which challenge social, political, and
economic structures of inequality and patriarchy, are seen as unacceptable by the state and
have been subjected to all kinds of retaliation by governments.”188 Even the few
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organizations based on feminist agendas run up against the State, and the asymmetry of
power between the two means that the former must toe the line or get shut down, as was
the case with ASR. Thus, while issues such as “micro-credit or bringing/integrating women
into the market is not contested … the right to abortion or even a survey on domestic
violence becomes highly contested.”

189

The former touches on feminist issues and

women’s empowerment without it being specifically linked to a gender specific policy.
Thus, it does not run into the kind of resistance that a cause such as advocating for the right
to an abortion does, an issue particularly fraught with risk in a conservative country like
Pakistan, where the State often colludes with the religious right, thus becoming a
perpetrator in the oppression of women.
This fact also brings up the balancing act any organization lobbying for women’s
rights must perform. It needs the State to pass laws specific to women’s issues while
actively being persecuted by the State itself on certain issues. The conservative nature of
the State and population at large also shows up in feminist organizations such as the WAF
itself. As artist Lala Rukh points out, “the discourse on patriarchy has been weak even
within WAF, perhaps due to the presence of a number of conservative and religious women
uncomfortable with the term feminism.”190 Before the War on Terror, most of the
opposition to such organizations had come from the conservative nature of the State and
population and the patriarchal bureaucracy post 9/11. Now, a new element of religious
fanaticism has been added to the mix, where NGOs are targeted for being foreign funded
and spreading a Western agenda in Pakistan. The consequences of taking a bold stance on
women’s rights can lead to violence and fatwas (religious edicts) declaring such
189
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organizations and its members as spreading sin, which in turn encourages violence against
them.

A Path Forward
By focusing on the women of Swat, Thapa brigade, NGOS, and the others in
different social locations and positions, we see that resistance to patriarchal norms is not
just the domain of privileged women. As Shaheed aptly reiterates “women do not comprise
of a homogeneous collective with identical interests. They are divided by class and
privilege and distinguished by culture, upbringing, personal experiences and life choices,
to name but a few differences.”191 We need to broaden the conception of what
empowerment and resistance means for different women. The notions of equality and
inclusion of the Thapa Brigade might be different from those working in NGOs, but one’s
struggle against the chokehold of patriarchy is not more valid than the others.
Moreover, we need to reconceptualize the notion of political, as the women in Swat
problematize the divide between the private and public, as some secular notions designed
for inclusion can exclude while the religious can act as inclusive space. These movements
highlight a path forward showing that women are active agents of change, and that
resistance and autonomy take various forms dependent on context.
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Conclusion
Citizenship is a multifaceted, multivalent concept with a relational impact on
individuals and groups based on various affiliative factors that range from gender, class,
religion to political, social, and ethnic divisions; based on these factors, power dynamics
between the state and the citizen change. By using situated citizenship, one has an
intersectional close-up view of the lived experience of the female Muslim citizen in
Pakistan. It provides insight into the rights given by the state and the citizen’s ability to
claim and perform these rights based on socio-religious impact of norms and informal
rules. The state of Pakistan’s failed promise of equality for all its citizens is embodied by
the on-ground gendered relationship of its females with the state as unequal and secondclass citizens.
Looking at gendered violence against women through the situated approach of
citizenship, a “continuum of sexual violence”192 can be observed, which is historically
ingrained in the very fabric of the country. Under colonial rule, the Muslim community of
India felt an impending threat of erasure to their values and norms. In response to this,
national/political difference were drawn on the bodies of Muslim women. “The
feminization of the colonized male at the hands of the colonial power was matched by the
vigorous assertion of masculinity in the home; a masculinity proved and redeemed by an
equally exaggerated femininity.”193 Thus, Muslim womanhood was constructed to
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safeguard Muslim manhood along the line of religious and cultural difference, which
turned women into victims of, and symbols of, their own cultures.
In Pakistan, Islam is co-opted by the state and political parties to present the
version most beneficial to them, to define the parameters of citizenship based on religion.
The political, civil, and social all become sites of contestations of rights given and rights
performed in the milieu of religion. Women become the emblem of regime changes as their
status and role is re-defined in conjunction with the state. This status has evolved over time,
but the enforcement of gendered laws, such as the Hudood ordinance, is used to silence
and punish women; they are forced outside the ambit of state protection. The state itself
legitimizes the secondary status of women by discouraging them to pursue justice against
the crimes committed against them. This, in turn, acts as a deterrent for women to enact
their rights as full citizens of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
A close look at the life of a female Pakistani Muslim citizen within the parameters
of history, politics, community, and home presents an intersectional view of violence being
perpetuated against them. The lived reality of the Muslim woman bridges the gap between
theory and praxis. Maria Tahir and Mukhtaran Bibi, along with the research participants,
presented the on-the-ground truth of how women accessing justice were silenced or
punished further by state and society. Moreover, the primary data collected highlights the
social ideology that ties rape crimes to honor and control, rather than justice.
However, there is hope! This disingenuous label of the ‘victim’ disempowers
women and takes away their stories of resistance and resilience. As Spivak states, Western
intellectuals use knowledge about marginalized groups to give them voice, thus rendering
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them silent, as the subject does not have the agency to speak for themselves.194 Keeping
this in mind, I drew from primary sources such as interviews, questionnaires,
documentaries, and newspapers, to highlight the voice of women as visible, autonomous
beings. Fighting to bring about change, rebelling against the patriarchal chokehold of the
state, where the mere presence of women is seen as a threat, being visible is also resistance.
But moments in Pakistan’s timeline have shown that even within a heavily rigged
patriarchal structure, women from Swat, women in the Thapa brigade, women like
Mukhtaran Bibi and Maria Tahir and so many more, are all fighting for change, for equal
access to social, political, and civil rights. The struggle and resistance of the women of
Pakistan highlights the “fluidity of citizenship, which is determined, in part, through
complex and contradictory, daily lived experience… [by moving beyond] notions of
citizenship as narrow formal legal status and [by] adopting a definition of citizenship as
legal status and embodied intersectional social relation.”195
Before my interview with Mukhtaran Bibi, I had thought of using my interview
with her to highlight the victimization through injustices visited upon women by state,
community, and family. Women became one-dimensional characters viewed through an
internalized male gaze, defined only by their sexuality. Yet Mukhtaran Bibi was so much
more than a rape victim-survivor. The label bestowed upon her made me envision a woman
stuck in a moment; but when I spoke to her, I realized she is achieving so much, she IS so
much; her strength and humor shine through. Women speaking their truth is resistance; it
opens sites of contestations and negotiations within a highly patriarchal structure where
they were once voiceless and invisible.
194
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